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Throughout the centuries, the experience of race has profoundly marked the history 
of Europe and the United States and has played a fundamental role in the very definition 
of the Western world’s identity. Race is a complex, malleable concept that has been 
conceived and interpreted in different ways according to different historical, cultural and 
social contexts. Originally theorized as a biological justification for European 
imperialism and the institution of the Atlantic slave trade, its definition has changed over 
time and it is now generally accepted that race, rather than a reality grounded in biology, 
is an inherently social construct. It is worth noting, however, that being socially 
constructed does not imply that it does not exist; indeed, the concepts of race and racism 
are far from being eradicated, as they still have a strong influence over individuals’ lives, 
as well as on the organization of society as a whole.  
In this work I have focused on the issue of race in the context of the United States and 
more specifically on how this concept has been created and deployed, from plantation 
slavery onward, to construct and maintain unequal relationships of power. My study is 
concerned in particular with the analysis of the field of representation both as a site in 
which the racialized order is constantly produced and reproduced, and as a potential site 
of resistance that holds revolutionary possibilities. The choice of the topics derives from 
a personal interest in the themes related to race and the experience of racism, which are 
increasingly debated topics not only in the United States but also in Europe, where the 
growing number of immigrants mainly coming from Africa forces many European 
countries to critically interrogate their colonialist past.  
 
The first chapter deals with the representation of blackness and the fundamental role 
played by visuality in the construction of the black subject as less than human. The first 
part of the chapter serves as an introduction for the main theme and addresses various 
theoretical concepts regarding the concept of race itself and the debate on the opportunity 
to use it as an analytical category for the study of contemporary US society.  
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Then the focus shifts to the analysis of the inextricable link between visuality and 
race, as the visual field and the way we are taught to look are crucial for the production 
and the reproduction of racial blackness. The main argument is that the visual field, by 
means of the racial imagery composed by stereotypical and degrading images of the 
racialized Other, is the privileged site where meanings about race are constructed. The 
scopic regime of race, which refers to all the visual systems, either cultural, political, or 
technological, deployed by the dominant group to maintain power relations, has not only 
naturalized the decoding of human differentiation according to racial features, but it has 
also supported the US racial hierarchy that has posited whiteness, perceived as the 
unmarked human norm, at the top of the social order and blackness, conceived as an 
inherently degraded and abject condition, at the bottom.  
The final part of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the stereotypical images of 
blackness that have been constructed throughout the centuries to justify the oppression 
and the violence perpetrated against black people. The analysis of the racist archive starts 
from the Enlightenment period as a crucial time in which elaborated concepts of race 
began to be developed and the inherent difference between “human species” started to be 
perceived as an incontrovertible scientific truth. The concept of race theorized in the 
eighteenth century became even more grounded in supposed scientific evidence with 
nineteenth-century scientific racism, which attempted to explain biological racial 
differences in visual and measurable terms. In the context of the United States, during the 
period of plantation slavery, a new set of stereotypical images of blackness emerged. The 
main feature of the racialized regime of representation that was constructed during slavery 
was its effort to depict the subordinate status of black as a natural condition that derived 
from innate and unmodifiable characteristics. Stereotypical images differed between 
black men and black women, as they were subjected to different kinds of oppression. In 
general, while controlling images of men aimed at the infantilization of the black male 
slave, who was deprived of his masculine attributes and authority, the representation of 
black women was entirely centered around their sexuality and the need to control their 
fertility, since women were the means through which slavery itself was reproduced, thus 
making their body a crucial site of control. The images of black manhood and 
womanhood produced during slavery, such as the Mammy, the Jezebel, the Tom and the 
Sambo stereotypes, became the basic “grammar of race” through which the white pubic 
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learned to see blackness as degraded. Finally, the last paragraphs retrace the evolutions 
of the traditional stereotypical images of blackness after Emancipation and in 
contemporary US society following changing patterns of oppression, in order to underline 
the “tragic continuities” that can be identified in the constitution of blackness as an abject 
and threatening condition. Therefore, although the representations of blackness have 
changed over the centuries, they all contributed to the constant devaluation of black 
bodies which resurfaces continuously in today’s society, as the frequent murders of black 
people by the police tragically testify.  
 
The second chapter focuses on the possibility of agency and resistance deployed by 
black people within the field of visuality and on the ways in which they have challenged 
and contested the dominant regime of representation by employing a wide range of 
counterstrategies. The overall idea is that in the history of the United States, black people 
have always been the social group whose “right to look,” to quote Nicholas Mirzoeff, has 
constantly been denied and repressed, but this condition did not prevented blacks from 
engaging in a longstanding fight to regain power over the hostile field of visuality that 
has created the inherent association between blackness and abjection. In this resistance 
struggle, the power of the dominated lies in the possibility to speak against the hegemonic 
representation of blackness not only by pointing to and questioning the racist stereotypical 
archive through which blackness is perceived, but also in the creation of alternative and 
counterhegemonic images in order to challenge the scopic regime of race. In order to 
produce an alternative visuality able to challenge the degrading archive of blackness, 
black people have been both the producers of images and the object of those images; in 
this last case, however, differently from racist representations, they were not passive 
objects, but they managed to control and manipulate their own images for artistic or 
political purposes and to support their claims. 
The next section of the chapter presents two crucial figures that engaged in the visual 
struggle for blacks’ self-representation between the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
century, namely Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. Douglass and Truth were both 
former slaves that, through an extensive use of photography, produced and disseminated 
their own self-representations and asserted their total control over their own images and 
the meanings that were attached to them. Indeed, they were both able to subvert 
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photography’s repressive functions and crucially contributed to the deconstruction of 
hegemonic representations of black masculine and feminine subjectivities.  
After an analysis of early attempts to challenge the racist archive of blackness, the 
chapter provides a theoretical introduction concerning the important role of realism and 
authenticity as representational counterstrategies adopted by black Americans, as well as 
an overview of the debate over positive and negative images which also addresses 
critiques highlighting the limitations of these approaches. Then, the focus shifts to the 
three main strategies adopted by black Americans to confront hegemonic culture: the first 
one is the acceptance of the stereotype and has been of particular importance for black 
women, who have adopted the politics of respectability as a way to resist racist depictions; 
the second strategy is negotiation, which has been used to adapt the stereotypes for 
personal benefit especially by black cultural producers and performers; the third approach 
is ironic appropriation and it involves the opposition of the stereotype by means of parody 
and irony. Finally, the last part of the chapter is concerned with the ways in which black 
Americans, rather than providing alternative self-representation, have directly challenged 
the realm of visuality itself, especially in contemporary times. The overall idea is to 
challenge the scopic regime of race itself by showing and uncovering the visual 
mechanisms through which human differentiation, racialized subjects and the black/white 
polar opposition are constructed by interrogating the act of seeing itself.  
 
The third chapter deals with the case of Rachel Dolezal, an American woman whose 
“racial fakery” gained worldwide attention in 2015 and has caused a heated debate in the 
United States about the nature of race, the concepts of blackness and whiteness and more 
general issues regarding representation, visuality and the very history of racial identity in 
the country. The first part of the chapter retraces this case of racial performativity and its 
background. In 2015, Rachel Dolezal, a woman who had presented herself as black for a 
number of years was accused of having lied about her identity and “outed” as white on 
the media. The accusation was based on the comparison between the photographs of a 
teenage Dolezal with blond hair and pale skin and the current appearance of the woman 
who has a darker complexion and typically black hairstyles. Dolezal has responded to the 
allegation of racial fakery by claiming that she identified as black despite her parentage 
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and by showing her actual connection with black contexts both on the public and on the 
personal level.  
The chapter then moves on to an in-depth analysis of the reactions caused by the 
Dolezal case and her identity claims with a specific focus on the allegations of blackface, 
cultural appropriation and “reverse passing.” The analysis of the debate shows that most 
of the reactions to Dolezal’s claim of blackness have been negative and that only a few 
commentators have perceived her claims as legitimate. However, in some cases, the 
negative reactions turn out to be problematic, in that they rely on essentialist conceptions 
of race that are based either on a supposed biological reality of race based on ancestry 
and lineage or the existence of an authentic and monolithic experience of blackness.  In 
the last section, the chapter addresses the debate concerning the connection between 
transgender and transracial identities that emerged from the comparison of Rachel 
Dolezal’s and Caitlyn Jenner’s identity claims. After the analysis of the two categories 
and the ways in which they have both changed over time to include new identity claims 
the focus is on the debate generated by the juxtaposition of Jenner’s and Dolezal’s cases 



















































Throughout the history of the Western world, and more specifically starting from the 
modern period, race has been a fundamental issue that has become inextricably linked to 
the concept of modernity itself. Race, as an object of study and analysis, has been 
addressed from different perspectives; indeed, race has been conceived as either a social 
construct, a scientific and empirical reality, a political strategy of control and power over 
a specific group or simply dismissed as non existent. Defining what race actually is, is a 
rather hard task and over the centuries the definition has changed according to different 
cultural, social and historical conditions. 
However, it is undeniable that the experience of race has been and still is fundamental 
for the Western world’s identity and that has profoundly marked the history of Europe 
and the United States and the development of Western modern capitalism in general. It is 
an issue that not only influences peoples’ everyday life but that also persists at the 
academic level and that has troubled many scholars that have dealt with race, such as 
W.E.B. Du Bois, Franz Fanon, bell hooks, Edward Said, and Paul Gilroy just to name a 
few.  
Race and the consequent conceptualization of racism are complex but rather flexible 
concepts that have influenced individuals and society as a whole on many different levels 
and it seems that their importance is not going to diminish anytime soon; as Howard 
Winant puts it: “[…] the concept persists, as idea, as practice, as identity, and as social 
structure. Racism perseveres in these same ways.”1 It is therefore important to understand 
why race and racism are still so important in today’s society by focusing on the 
construction and the changes of these concepts throughout history. In other words, it is 
necessary “to dig into the archaeology of a racial present, to know more about the 
                                               
1 Howard Winant, “Race and Racism: Towards a Global Future,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29(5), 
2006, p. 986. 
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historical dynamic of race […]” as a response to “[…] a need to make sense of the current 
racial present in the West […].”2  
While the experiences of race and racism are common to humankind itself, in this 
dissertation the focus will be on race and racism in the context of the United States and 
more specifically on the construction and representation of blackness. The main goal is 
to better understand how black people became the epitome of racialized bodies 
throughout the centuries. In order to construct the racialization of black people, the issue 
of representation has always been fundamental. It is clear that representations of 
blackness changed throughout the centuries, starting from the Atlantic slave trade, the 
period of plantation slavery, as well as after the emancipation. However, it is worth 
highlighting that they all contributed to the negative value and meaning attached to black 
bodies that still in today’s society haunt the lives of black people, as also testified by the 
recent murders of black people in the US by the police. Indeed, the constant devaluation 
of blackness has led to the creation of a system of unequal power relationships, as well 
as a society where racism is institutionalized and that is based on whiteness as the norm3. 
 
1.   The concept of race 
As already noted, either in the cultural and political discourse and in the academic 
field, the category of race itself is difficult to define and its boundaries are blurred and 
not fixed. While race is almost universally acknowledged as a social construction and not 
a physical reality, there is no such agreement on how the concept of race should inform 
and influence the political, social, and cultural debate. In particular, because it is not an 
actual reality, there has been the claim that the concept and even the word “race” should 
be abandoned, placing on it what W.J.T. Mitchell defines “a veil of disavowal”4. The 
progressive negation of race and the idea that race itself is insignificant has led to two 
different theories, namely the idea that we now live in a “post-racial era” and that of 
colorblind universalism. While these two arguments have entirely different implications, 
they share the assumption that, given its fictional nature, the traditional concept of race 
should not be used as an analytical tool for the study of contemporary society.  
                                               
2 Ash Amin, “The Reminder of Race,” Theory, Culture and Society, 27, 2010, pp. 2-3. 
3 Carolyn Finney, “Brave New World? Ruminations on Race in the Twenty-first Century,” Antipode, 
XLVI, 5, 2014, p. 1278. 
4 W.J.T. Mitchell, Seeing through Race, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 10. 
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1.1. Post-racial theory and colorblindness 
The first argument is based on the belief that US society has reached what has been 
defined a “post-racial era”.  The idea is that society as a whole has moved beyond 
traditional racial categories and that race is a discredited concept that entirely belongs to 
the past. In general, post-racial theorists5, while they acknowledge the foundational 
importance of race for US society in the past, believe that today’s society is finally free 
from this heavy burden and from the need to use the idea of race as an analytic concept, 
as it has been thoroughly deconstructed.6 Using it, they maintain, is dangerous as it may 
substantiate what is merely a fiction. 
Many believe that the post-racial era was inaugurated by Anthony Appiah’s famous 
statement that “the truth is that there are no races.”7 Appiah’s work builds on classical 
race theorist W.E.B. Du Bois who, at the end of the nineteenth century, was the first one 
to theorize race as a product of power and resistance rather than a biological inheritance 
in his seminal study regarding “the Negro problem.”8 Appiah attempted to complete what 
he considered DuBois’ “incomplete argument” to “assimilate the unbiological nature of 
races” and to articulate a positive concept of race.9 With regards to the heavy burden of 
race mentioned above, his main claim is that the abandonment of race as a concept would 
mean that society would be liberated from illogical thinking and the mystification of 
pseudoscience and that the periodical reemergence of presumed biological notions of race 
would be prevented.   
Another cultural and social theorist that supports the necessity of a society that is 
liberated from race as a code of human categorization is Paul Gilroy. In contrast with 
post-racial theorists, however, he acknowledges the utopian nature of his project calling 
for the renunciation of race. In his essay Against Race, Gilroy states that identity and 
belonging must be reconfigured around post-racial thinking and therefore he champions 
a new “planetary humanism” based on a consciousness of shared values that do not belong 
                                               
5 See, for example, the work of the Marxist sociologist Robert Miles. 
6 Finney, “Brave New World?,” p. 1279. 
7 Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, p. 45.  
8 W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Study of the Negro Problems,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 11, 1898, pp. 1–23. 
9 Anthony Appiah, “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,” Critical 
Inquiry, 12 (1), 1985, p. 22. 
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to racial categorizations.10 Rather, this consciousness emerges in the context of a 
transnational identity that can be found at the crossroad of what he calls “the Black 
Atlantic” and that is a characteristic of all the people who have a diasporic past.11 
On the other hand, the second argument that derives from the disavowal of race as an 
analytical category for the study of today’s society is the so-called “color blindness”. This 
idea is rooted in the belief that racial group membership and race-based differences 
should not be taken into account; it is especially important for current political discourse 
in the US when it comes to calculate the impact of race on either policy decisions, 
legislation, and programs. While the ideology of color blindness might seem a positive 
way to tackle the complex issue of race by erasing the color line, it has been proven that 
most of the time the consequences are entirely counterproductive.12 Indeed, the colorblind 
approach, in contrast with its original intentions, results in the “silencing” of race at the 
public level. According to Harries, colorblindness implies the public disavowal of race 
and the consequence is “[…] the denial of the meanings and effects of race.”13 Therefore, 
rather than an empowering concept that neutralizes racism in the public space, 
colorblindness hides racial dynamics and contributes to maintaining white privilege by 
silencing the word race itself.  
The silencing of race as a category has also other negative implications: first of all, it 
fails to recognize any real relationships between the historical construction of race and 
racism and the current manifestations of these social constructions in US society.14 
Secondly, it is entirely counterproductive for those who fight for racial equality, as it 
denies the possibility to name race and consequently to bring to light white privilege and 
challenge everyday racism. Finally, it is worth noting that the colorblind approach has 
been used with malicious intents, especially within recent political discourse. More 
specifically, as it has been poignantly argued by black feminist scholars in particular, 
colorblindness serves to hide the institutional nature of racism and to place the 
                                               
10 Paul Gilroy, Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line, Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
11 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, London: Verso, 1993. 
12 See, for example Finney, “Brave New World?”; Amin, “The Reminder of Race”; Bethan Harries, 
“We Need to Talk about Race,” Sociology, XLVIII, 6, 2014, pp. 1107-1122; Cornel West, Race 
Matters, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993; InteRGRace, Visualità e (anti)razzismo, Padova: Padova University 
Press, 2018. 
13 Harries, “We Need to Talk about Race,” p. 1108. 
14 Finney, “Brave New World?,” p. 1279. 
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responsibilities for conditions of extreme poverty, homelessness, unemployment that 
mainly affect African Americans on individuals rather than on the relationships of 
unequal power constructed throughout the centuries.15 
 
1.2. The paradox of race 
The previous paragraph has briefly showed that the idea of relegating the category of 
race to the past seems to be totally ineffective to recognize, address and challenge present 
racism. It has also showed what has been defined “the paradox of race”, namely the fact 
that even though the concept has been exposed as entirely false and a myth, race thinking 
and racism persist and resurface continuously. The idea on which many anti-racist 
arguments are based, that race and racism are completely irrational and that “[i]f we can 
just stop talking about race […] then maybe racism will disappear […] has been proven 
wrong.”16 
Indeed, far from having moved beyond traditional racial categories, it actually seems 
that race still plays a fundamental role in many aspects of today’s US society. As Cornel 
West argues in his most famous (and self-explanatory) work Race Matters, “[t]he 
astonishing disappearance of the event from public dialogue is testimony to just how 
painful and distressing a serious engagement with race is.”17 
In other words, while race is fiction, it is a fiction with great power on the lives of 
racialized people; it  
[…] is indeed a myth but one that, like all myths, has a powerful afterlife that continues 
to structure perception, experience, and thought and to play a real role in history. […] A 
myth is not simply a false belief, an epistemological mistake. It is a powerful story that 
endures over many generations, subject to endless reinterpretation and reenactment for 
new historical situations.18  
Given the fictional but powerful nature of race, within the academic field, there is no 
general agreement on if and how to use this analytical category. For example, for Gilroy, 
there is no recuperating or redeeming, no readily de- or re-signifying the concept of race, 
while other scholars believe that the concept of race itself carries revolutionary 
possibilities. These possibilities can be used as tools for the rise of a counterculture, to 
                                               
15 bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation, Boston: South End Press, 1992. 
16 Mitchell, Seeing through Race, p. XII.  
17 West, Race Matters, p. 262. 
18 Mitchell, Seeing through Race, p. 22. 
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engage systemic and structural processes of racialization and ultimately for another 
“doing” of race.19 In order to recognize and challenge the various types of racism that 
permeate current society and to move beyond the “cul-de-sac of the post-racial era”20, it 
is necessary to uncover, discover, and name race as a cultural device to create a 
hierarchical order of power relationships.21  
It is therefore clear that a post-racial or colorblind society is far from being reached 
and that race still influences many aspects of everyday life, making present society 
intensely marked by racial categories. As Amin puts it: 
[i]f race thinking and acting, depressingly, has become ingrained in vernacular and 
institutional practice due to the force of stacked legacies of reading human difference 
and worth in racial terms, the journey to a non-racial future may prove to be one of 
misplaced hope and disappointment, and certainly a very long and arduous one.22 
In the next paragraphs, specific attention will be devoted to the creation of the 
concept of race, and in particular of racial blackness in the United States. The focus will 
be on the importance of representation and the visual field for the construction of the 
racialized Other starting from the period of colonialism and the slave trade.  
 
2.   Visuality and race 
Race has been proven to be an illusion; it is inconsistent at the biological level, 
since there are no valid scientific definitions or the evidence that humankind can be 
divided according to specific phenotypical characteristics; what is more, it is an entirely 
illogical concept at the ethics level, as there is no correlation between physical 
characteristics and one’s inclinations or behavior.23 Yet, in every aspect of US society 
race is pervasive and persists as a longstanding and mutable construction; as Richard Dyer 
puts it: “[r]ace is not the only factor […], but it is never not a factor, never not in play.”24 
In other words, notwithstanding the fictional nature of race, it is almost impossible not to 
read reality according to racial traits. It has been almost universally acknowledged that 
the fact that race still plays a fundamental role in everyday experience, and especially for 
                                               
19 Finney, “Brave New World?,” p. 1277. 
20 Mitchell, Seeing through Race, p. XII. 
21 Annalisa Frisina, “Introduzione”, in InteRGRace, Visualità e (anti)razzismo, p. 3. 
22 Amin, “The Reminder of Race,” p. 13. 
23 Anna Scacchi, “Vedere la razza/fare la razza,” in Bordin E. and Bosco S., A Fior di Pelle: 
Bianchezza, Nerezza, Visualità, Verona: ombre corte, 2017, p. 18. 
24 Richard Dyer, White, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 1.  
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the lives of racialized people, derives from the fact that it is a powerful and continuously 
self-repeating social construction.   
The creation and the ceaseless reproduction of the concept of race began during the 
colonialist period and the Atlantic slave trade and its main aim was to justify the violent 
brutalization of black bodies by making them seem less than human, according to specific 
physical traits.25 As already stated, the legacy of this imposed racialization still haunts the 
lives of black people. It is therefore clear that racial imagery has been purported and 
maintained by strong power relationships that support the hierarchy created between the 
different races, even after the concept of race itself has been dismantled.  
One of the factors that make race so difficult to erase from social and political 
discourse and everyday practice is the fact that, differently from other sources of 
discrimination, such as sexual orientation, it is a visual marker, something that can be 
identified by using sight. This idea, however, could imply that we are able to identify 
physical characteristics, such as hair, the shape of the nose and the lips, etc. that are 
specific of a particular group of people, something that is in fact not possible. As a matter 
of fact, we are able to ‘see’ race because the way we look at thing is not neutral but is 
itself informed by the racial imagery that society supports and perpetuates.26 It is therefore 
clear that there is an inextricable link between visuality and race and that “there is power 
in looking.”27 
 
2.1. Critical studies of race and visual culture studies 
In the last decades, it has been poignantly argued by many theorist and scholars that 
the visual field and the way we look are crucial for the production and the reproduction 
of race.28 The first statement made by Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright in their work 
about visual culture is that “[e]very day we engage in practices of looking to make sense 
                                               
25 Nicholas Mirzoeff, The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality, Durham (NC): Duke 
University Press, 2011, p. 63. 
26 Judith Butler, “Endangered/endangering: schematic racism and white paranoia,” in Robert 
Gooding-Williams (ed.), Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 
18. 
27 bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation, p. 115. 
28 See for example Nicholas Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture, New York-London: 
Routledge, 1999; bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation; Dyer, White; W.J.T. Mitchell, 
“Showing Seeing,” Journal of Visual Culture, I, 2, 2002, pp. 165-181; Michelle Shawn Smith, “Visual 
Culture and Race,” MELUS, XXXIX, 2, 2014 pp. 1-11; Nicole Fleetwood, Troubling Visions: 
Performance, Visuality, and Blackness, Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
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of the word.”29 While it might seem a rather obvious assertion, its implications are far 
more complex. In particular, it implies that it is through the inherently social practice of 
looking that we negotiate social relationships, as well as the meaning and the value 
attached to what we see.  
Within the academic field, the link between visuality and race has been tackled from 
different points of view. The most traditional perspective focuses on the study of “the 
spectacle of racism” and the history of racist representations that range from artwork to 
images and texts that normalize and perpetrate human hierarchy into different races.  On 
the other hand, however, the most interesting and innovative theories regarding visuality 
and race are the result of an interdisciplinary effort shared by two distinct field, namely 
critical studies of race and visual culture studies.30 The main focus of the two fields is 
different, as critical race studies are concerned with the social construction of race 
throughout the centuries and in contemporary society, while visual culture interrogates 
the act of seeing and what it means to perform this act. Hal Foster, in the introduction of 
a seminal collection of essays about visual culture, differentiates between vision, i.e. sight 
as a physical operation, and visuality, i.e. sight as a social fact that is constructed by 
social, cultural and historical factors, what he defines “its discursive determinations.”31  
 The fruitful encounter of these two fields of study, therefore, brings together the 
question of visuality and race, arguing that since sight is a social practice, it is also a 
racialized practice; in a nutshell, they try to move beyond an analysis of racial 
representation per se, and instead to investigate “how subjects adopt racial positions as 
they learn how to look.”32 Racialization, therefore acts not only upon the object of view 
but also on the viewer, as she/he adopts cultural and historical racial codes to interpret 
reality. Indeed, seeing cannot be considered just a passive action and reception performed 
by our eyes, but most importantly seeing implies interpreting what is in front of us through 
specific social, cultural, and historical codes and assigning a certain value to the subject 
of our looking.33 In the words of the feminist scholar Judith Butler, there is at play “a 
racial schematization of the visible field” that makes seeing not an unmediated or neutral 
                                               
29 Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright, Practices of Looking: An Introduction of Visual Culture, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 9. 
30 Smith, “Visual Culture and Race,” p. 1. 
31 Hal Foster, “Preface,” in Vision and Visuality, Washington: Bay Press, 1988, p. IX. 
32 Smith, “Visual Culture and Race,” p. 2. 
33 Mirzoeff, An Introduction to Visual Culture, p. 13. 
 19 
action, not “[…] an act of direct perception, but the racial production of the visible, the 
workings of racial constraints on what it means to see.”34  
 
2.2. Race as medium 
The connection between race and visuality is best explained by Nicole Fleetwood 
when she asserts the performative nature of the visual sphere, since seeing race, as already 
noted, is not a transparent act, but rather “it is itself a ‘doing.’”35 Following the same 
logic, W.J.T. Mitchell, one of the most important scholars of visual studies, proposes to 
see race as a medium, a filter through which we interpret and classify humanity according 
to supposed racial differences.36 The general aim of Mitchell’s work is to reveal and de-
naturalize the act of seeing itself, claiming for the need to “show seeing”, that is to say 
“[…] to overcome the veil of familiarity and self-evidence that surrounds the experience 
of seeing[…]”; to show that our vision is informed by social and cultural constructions 
that we apply and reproduce in our everyday practice of seeing. In other words, seeing is 
not natural and objective, rather it is a mediated activity that it is “learned and cultivated” 
in a specific cultural, social, aesthetic and political context.37 Therefore, race can be 
understood as a lens through which we make sense of human differences and that creates 
power relationships of hierarchy; the visual field, is itself a hegemonic racial formation38 
that constructs the racialized Other through  
stereotypes, caricatures, classificatory figures, search images, mappings of the visible 
body, of the social spaces in which it appears […]. These images are the filters through 
which we recognize and of course misrecognize other people.39 
In the context of the United States, these images have become part of the collective 
imagination, starting from the period of plantation slavery and their target was usually 
the epitome of the racialized Other, that is to say the black person. These “controlling 
images”40 contributed to the construction of a specific idea of what blackness and being 
black means and implies; it is worth noting that the meaning attached to blackness, as 
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well as the representations of black people, changed continuously throughout the 
centuries, according to the social and political situation. In addition, images of blackness 
were, and still are, different depending on gender, as within US society the controlling 
images of black men and women served to justify different kinds of subjugation and 
violence.41 Therefore, as Herman Gray states, blackness is not a monolithic concept but 
it is a “[…] cultural signifier that […] remains open to multiple and competing claims”, 
since it refers “to the constellation of productions, histories, images, representations, and 
meanings associated with black presence in the United States.”42 
In the next paragraphs, these images and the ways in which they have changed over 
time will be analyzed, while the next chapter will address the way in which racial images 
and representations can be used to subvert the dominant and controlling gaze. However, 
before moving on to the analysis of stereotyped images, it is worth tackling some 
theoretical issues regarding the ways in which the hegemonic white gaze creates a regime 
that naturalizes human differences, namely the scopic regime of race.43 
 
3.   The scopic regime of race 
W.J.T. Mitchell in his attempt to “show seeing”, points to the importance to 
acknowledge that, as already stated, the visual field is a social construction but that the 
opposite is also true, namely the importance of the visual construction of the social field; 
the fact that “[i]t is not just that we see the way we do because we are social animals, but 
also that our social arrangements take the forms they do because we are seeing animals.”44 
In the same way, it is possible to claim that we see races because, as humans, we 
organize the reality in visual terms and vision is naturalized as “a primordial tool of 
human perception and thus differentiation.”45 Indeed, notwithstanding its inconsistence, 
we see and define race primarily by specific physical traits, such as the shape of the nose, 
the lips and in particular the color of the skin. In creating the black subject, therefore, the 
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visual field is crucial; from the very beginning of the racial thinking that started with 
European colonialism and the Atlantic slave trade, bodily characteristics and the color of 
the skin played a fundamental role, as they soon became the exterior evidence of an 
internal difference.46  
The creation, theorization, and perpetration of racial blackness as an inescapable 
visual marking47 is best understood by using the notion of “scopic regime”, which was 
first theorized by film theorist Christian Metz, later expanded by cultural theorist Martin 
Jay and finally used in the field of black and critical race studies.48 In general, the concept 
of scopic regime is a theoretical framework to discuss “the power of looking and optical 
tools to assess, surveil, and represent the visual world.”49 The scopic regime, in other 
words, places the visual field and the gaze at the center of dynamics of power and 
hegemony. This notion turns out to be extremely useful when discussing issues of race 
and the creation of hierarchies based on racial differences. Indeed, theorists that discuss 
the issue of blackness and the visual field have created the concept of the scopic regime 
of race, which refers to all the visual systems, either cultural, political, or technological 
deployed by the dominant group to maintain power relations and make not only possible, 
but also natural the decoding of human differentiation according to racial features.50 The 
importance of the technological apparatus should not be underestimated; it is worth 
noting, however, that many scholars have focused on how optical technologies, especially 
photography, have been used to define and discipline racialized bodies.51 As Fleetwood 
puts it, 
[v]ision and visual technologies, in this context, are seen as hostile and violent forces 
that render blackness as aberration, given the long and brutal history of black subjugation 
through various technologies, visual apparatus among them.52 
As already noted, the archive of images and representations on which a specific scopic 
regime is based may change considerably over time. However, there are dynamics of 
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power that can be retraced in every visual regime and, with regards to the construction of 
blackness, it is worth highlighting that there are common features that can be retraced in 
the visual archive. 
 
3.1. Naturalization 
The scopic regime of race in the United States creates a reality that is undeniably 
organized according to racial codes. However, this state of things can only be maintained 
and reproduced by hiding the carefully arranged hierarchy between racialized groups of 
people, as well as the dominant structuring principles that underline this imposed 
hierarchy.53 In other words, the practices of looking and interpreting reality through an 
inherently racist ideology are made to seem natural and inevitable.54 In this way, racial 
hierarchies are not questioned because the way in which they are constructed and 
maintained are hidden under the veil of the naturalization of human difference.55 
As Ash states, “[t]he details of colour, shape, smell, behaviour, disposition, intent, 
picked out by racial scopic regimes as tellers of human grouping and social standing – 
etched over a long historical period across a spectrum of communication media” become 
progressively natural and given.56 Therefore, within the visual field, race is constructed 
as something given and it is “made to appear as if it has always existed, thereby denying 
[its] coerced and cultivated production.”57 Through the naturalization of the differences 
the cultural hegemony maintains its power while keeping hidden the strategies that 
underline the visual system of racial marking.  
In order to make the scopic regime of race visible, it is necessary to question the 
supposed natural hierarchy of sight by historicizing vision and specifying its dominant 
practices. According to Foster, the strategies deployed by the racial scopic regime can 
only be uncovered and questioned through “the recognition that vision has a history” 58 
and that the each scopic regime, far from being given or natural, has always been 
contested by alternative visual regimes that were constructed on a critical and 
oppositional gaze. The ways in which the racialized field of vision has been questioned 
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and challenged and how black people have always been struggling not only for more 
realistic representations, but also for their own “right to look”59 will be the main themes 
of the next chapter. 
 
3.2. Hypervisibility  
It has been argued that, in US visual culture, African Americans are simultaneously 
hyper-visible and invisible.60 This paradox is the direct consequence of the ways in which 
the racial scopic regime constructs black subjectivity and subjugates blacks through 
visual coding. Indeed, on the one hand black subjects are a visible and troubling presence, 
as they are defined by their inescapable racial markings.61 On the other hand, in order to 
maintain power relations, their presence is constantly denied at every level of society. 
This longstanding paradox is best described by the notion of hypervisibility that is 
frequently used in black cultural studies to  
[…] describe processes that produce the overrepresentation of certain images of blacks 
and the visual currency of these images in public culture. It simultaneously announces 
the continual invisibility of ethical and enfleshed subjects in various realms of polity, 
economies, and discourse, so that blackness remains aligned with negation and decay.62 
Therefore, black people are always exposed and almost impossible not to see, as 
“the very markers that reveal you to the rest of the world, your dark skin and your 
kinky/curly hair, are visual.”63 At the same time, they are underexposed and marginalized 
and black experience is constantly excluded from political and ethical life, making them 
invisible in the history of the United States, as well as in current public discourse and 
representations.64 
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3.3.Whiteness as the norm and white privilege  
The scopic regime of race makes it natural to see and interpret human differentiation 
in racial terms. In particular, in the context of the United States, but not exclusively, the 
concept of race is articulated in the visual field around the binary opposition of black and 
white. It is worth noting that this optical paradigm is organized around two colors that are 
entirely abstract; indeed, the black/white opposition is the extreme simplification of a 
spectrum of colors in which the two opposite poles do not even exist.65 Nonetheless, 
racialized visuality acts as if black and white and the meanings that they carry are real. 
As seen in the previous section, the scopic regime of race, in this polar opposition, 
constructs black skin as hypervisible, but what is important to highlight is that, 
consequently, whiteness is perceived as the unmarked norm, the ordinary, the standard. 
In other words, hypervisibility is a condition that only affects black people exactly 
because they are the ones who are ‘read’ in racial terms, while “[…] white people are not 
racially seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we 
are just people.”66  
In his pioneering work about the history and the meanings attached to whiteness, 
Richard Dyer explains that in a visual culture that is based on the visual field as source 
of knowledge and power, “[t]here is no more powerful position than being ‘just’ human”67 
and therefore being visible as white means being in a position of privilege. In a certain 
way, it could be argued that also whiteness is both visible and invisible:  on the one hand, 
being visible as white is itself a “passport to privilege”; on the other hand, being perceived 
as the human norm implies that racial superiority resides in that which cannot be seen. In 
other words, it is in unseen whiteness that resides power and there is no stronger and more 
secure position of power than that of the watcher.68 As a consequence, according to Dyer, 
in order to reveal and challenge the racial hierarchy, it is not enough to analyze and 
question the stereotypes around which blackness has been constructed, but it is also 
imperative to make whiteness “strange,” to identify white people as racialized subjects  
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and ultimately, “to make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the normative 
state of existence […].”69  
Dyer, in his project to make whiteness strange, takes inspiration from the short essay 
White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack written by Peggy McIntosh in 1989, 
in which she draws a list of everyday situations that show how being white gives her 
access to a series of unearned advantages that only derive from being identified as white.70 
More importantly, she argues that white people are taught not to see these assets and are 
made to believe that their accomplishments depend on their individual characteristics 
only. Because white people seem unable to see their white privilege it is necessary to 
unpack this “invisible weightless knapsack” and to show whiteness not only as a privilege 
but also as a position of power that reproduces the racial hierarchy.71  
 
4.   The construction of the Other 
[M]y experience of being a young black girl was one of living in relationship to images 
of blackness and black subjects that circulated broadly in the public sphere. As a child, 
I knew that I had no control over these images and how they were disseminated, but that 
many of my interactions in public spaces, with blacks and non-blacks, would be in 
conversation with these images. I also knew that those images, more often than not, 
presented a challenge to my existence […]72 
This quote taken from Nicole Fleetwood’s work about the iconicity of blackness, 
shows how blackness is an inherently social and cultural production; race is perpetually 
reproduced and naturalized through a longstanding and complex visual archive that 
translates in visual terms the racial ordering of reality.73 Indeed, the hierarchical definition 
of human differentiation relies on a set of images that can be ‘read’ in the black skin. The 
hegemonic white gaze, therefore, by using the filter of race produces and reproduces 
blackness as an actual “epidermal scheme.” 
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4.1. The Fanonian moment and double consciousness 
The power of the hegemonic white gaze, that is the power of the spectator74, fixes the 
meanings and values attached to blackness in the hyper visible sign of the black skin. In 
order to explain the mechanisms that inscribe the race on the skin of black people, many 
studies of black visuality and race take as their starting point Black Skin, White Masks by 
the French intellectual Franz Fanon written in 1952, and in particular an anecdote that is 
considered an actual racial primal scene. In this scene, that Fleetwood calls “the Fanonian 
moment,”75 the black body is imprisoned by the gaze of a white child: 
 
“Look, a Negro!” It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made 
a tight smile.  
“Look, a Negro!” It was true. It amused me.  
“Look, a Negro!” The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my 
amusement.  
“Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” Frightened! Frightened! Now they were 
beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter 
had become impossible.  
I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, stories, history, 
and above all historicity […]. Then, assailed at various points, the corporeal schema 
crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. 
I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected 
myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic 
characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual 
deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships […]76 
 
In this anecdote, there are several aspects that have become fundamental for both race 
and visual studies. Fanon exemplifies the huge power of the white gaze to imprison the 
black body in the hyper visible sign of the skin77. Through the hegemonic gaze, the black 
subject is deprived of his/her individuality in the process of epidermalization, which 
Stuart Hall defines as the literal “inscription of race in the skin.”78 Race is therefore not 
only the object of a gaze, but it is produced by the gaze itself. 
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Racial recognition, that is the process of recognition of the black subject as such, 
therefore, can only be painful, as it is mediated by the gaze of the white person that has 
constructed the concept of blackness through the visual archive of degrading racial 
images. The black subject comes to self-knowledge and discovers his/her blackness by 
being identified as black by an external gaze (“Look, a Negro!”) and by the perpetual 
production and circulation of a visual narrative that sketches an “historical-racial schema” 
on the black body.  
The skin and the body, therefore, carry the cultural meaning of blackness as a 
denigrated position, but the elements that constitute this racial schema, as Fanon states, 
“had been provided for me […] by the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a 
thousand details, anecdotes, stories.”79 Within these dynamics of seeing and being seen, 
emerges one of the foundational features of African American identity, namely the 
concept of “double-consciousness.” It was first used by W. E. B. Du Bois in The Souls of 
Black Folk to explain this “sense to see oneself through the eyes of others”80 that 
permeates so clearly Fanon’s racial primal scene and that he calls a “third-person 
consciousness.”81 Double-consciousness, though painful, is an inescapable condition for 
black people that are forced to internalize the codes and meanings of the process of racial 
recognition imposed by the white gaze. As Hall puts it, “[t]hey had the power to make us 
see and experience ourselves as ‘Other’.”82 However, as it will be argued more in detail 
in chapter two, it is worth noting that black subjects, throughout US history, have always 
challenged the authority of the gaze and have claimed for themselves the position of a 
seeing subject that creates meanings in the visual field through their oppositional gaze.83 
 
4.2. Stereotyping and the representation of Otherness 
Race, in order to maintain its power, must be continuously reproduced so that it is 
perceived as natural, as something given that cannot be questioned. The reproduction of 
race, as already stated, relies mainly on the visual field as the privileged site where 
meanings about race are constructed and racial hierarchies and classifications are 
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imposed.84 The US racial order relies on the representation of the black subject through a 
set of stereotypical images that have been produced throughout the centuries starting from 
the period of plantation slavery. There is, therefore, a strong connection between 
dynamics of domination and representation; as bell hooks states: “[f]rom slavery on, 
white supremacists have recognized that control over images is central in the maintenance 
of any system of racial dominion.”85  
The major strategy for the ideological and social construction of the black subject as 
completely Other is stereotyping. The philosopher Homi Bhabha, in his famous essay 
“The Other Question”, states that stereotyping is a mode of representation that is based 
on the concept of fixity: the Other is constructed as a fixed and unchanging reality that 
only carries a specific meaning (e.g., bestiality, sexual depravation, primitivity, etc.). 
What it is important to highlight, however, is the fact that the power of stereotypical 
discourse resides in the ambivalent way in which it works. On the one hand, the fixed 
reality of the other is presented as given and natural, thus constructing a “regime of 
truth;”86 on the other hand, stereotype is a form of knowledge that must be anxiously 
repeated in order to be perceived as real and to have the power to create and maintain 
racial hierarchies.  
It is clear that stereotyping is a crucial element in the exercise of symbolic power, as 
it reduces the subordinated social groups to a few, simple, and essential characteristics, 
which are presented as fixed by nature. Moreover, it contributes to the maintenance of 
the racialized order by setting symbolic boundaries between “[…] the 'normal' and the 
'deviant', […] the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what does not or 
is 'Other', between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Us and Them.”87 Within the scopic regime of 
race that prioritizes the visual field as creator of meanings, it is obvious that the key 
signifier of racial difference in the stereotype is also the most visible, namely skin. As the 
“Fanonian moment” already showed, skin becomes the epidermal scheme, a visible sign 
of the Other’s inferiority and degeneracy.88 
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Degrading images of Otherness, and in particular of blackness, have always been used 
as one of the main justifications for the oppression and the exploitation of black people 
in the United States.89 Moreover, the social construction of this inherent opposition is also 
crucial for the creation of whiteness; indeed, it could be argued that whiteness exists and 
has a specific meaning only when it is set against the racialized black Other.90 The 
centrality of blackness to the construction of whiteness mirrors the concept of 
“Orientalism” theorized by Edward Said; he believed that Europe constituted “the Orient” 
as a fixed and unified racial, geographical and political reality as a means through which 
to make sense of itself.91  
In the same way, in the US context, “African Americans […] remain the negative 
resource of valuable white Americans,”92 meaning that whiteness has been constructed 
through a process of negative recognition: while blackness carries fixed and, most of the 
time, degrading meanings, white people are given the privilege to see themselves in “their 
own infinite variety.”93 Being imprisoned in a stereotype, that is being defined by a 
limited range of images, means to be denied any form of subjectivity and as a 
consequence to carry “the burden of representation,” as Ella Shohat and Robert Stam call 
it in Unthinking Eurocentrism.94 Albert Memmi, to refer to the same idea, theorized the 
concept of the “mark of the plural” to explain that the racialized subject is denied the 
possibility to establish his/her own identity and can only be seen as one of the 
stereotypical images that is part of the visual archive of race; the white gaze reifies the 
black body as site of projection, as the very image of Otherness.95 
As previously noted, the stereotype, for its message to be successful, requires that it 
is repeated and reproduced incessantly. Moreover, the visuality of race includes a wide 
range of images that are not produced in a semiotic void, but they gain meaning when 
they are read in context. In other words, all the images through which difference and 
Otherness are represented are in an intertextual relationship; as Hall argues, “they do not 
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carry meaning or 'signify' on their own” but they are inextricably linked as they “gain in 
meaning when they are read in context, against or in connection with one another.”96  
It is worth noting that this longstanding and complex visual archive continues to play 
a crucial role in today’s US society and it is a kind of memory of the past that is often in 
contrast with the official narrative of the nation. As Scacchi argues, in US public 
discourse and in the “official” narration of the nation the most shameful aspects, i.e. 
slavery, segregation, and institutionalized racism, tend to be disavowed or censured, 
notwithstanding the fact that they actually represent the very foundation of the economic 
and political power of the United States. In the visual archive, however, this ‘invisible’ 
past is still alive and resurfaces continuously in current representations even without the 
awareness of the racial history of these images; in other words, these images still hold a 
strong power in today’s society, as they function as a framework through which reality is 
perceived, and they influence society as a whole, both at the popular and at the 
institutional level.97 
The next paragraph will be devoted to the analysis of the stereotypical images of 
blackness that have been constructed throughout the centuries to justify the oppression 
and the violence perpetrated against black people. However, before moving to the actual 
analysis of what the black feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins calls “controlling 
images,” it is important to address two theoretical issues that must be taken into account 
in the subsequent analysis.  
First, as Shohat and Stam have argued, while it is crucial to challenge and question 
the stereotypical representation of blackness as a carrier of negative and degrading 
meanings only, the opposite movement towards the creation of “authentic” images of 
blackness might turn out to be problematic. Indeed, the concepts of realism and 
authenticity imply that there is a neutral truth, a kind of “essentially descriptive”98 truth 
that could replace the stereotypical representation of blackness.99 As a matter of fact, an 
ideologically neutral representation is impossible, as the “the conceptual filters through 
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which forms of human otherness are mediated”100 precede any ‘authentic’ or ‘realistic’ 
representation. 
The second theoretical aspect has to do with the limitations of the stereotype approach 
to tackle the issue of the representation of blackness in the United States. On the one 
hand, the study of stereotypes in popular culture is extremely important to reveal the 
oppressive patterns of discrimination that these negative portrayals carry with themselves 
and the fact that they function as a form of actual social control. At the same time, 
however, the stereotype-centered approach should not be concerned with the images 
alone, but also with the historical and social context from which they emerged, as well as 
the development that a single stereotypical image and its cultural meanings have 
undergone over time.  Moreover, the focus on individual images might be useful to 
identify explicit racism but, at the same time, there is the risk that institutionally structured 
racism may not emerge. Therefore, while the stereotype approach remains important for 
the analysis of the representation of blackness, it is also crucial to take into account the 
broader context and focus on the role of the stereotypes within the larger configurations 
of power.101 
 
5.   Representations of blackness 
The process of subjectification of black people and the construction of blackness as 
an abject condition is based on the visual representation of human difference. As seen in 
the previous sections, the scopic regime of race is based on stereotypical images that 
construct the racialized subject as something inherently Other from the Self; as a 
consequence, the racialized subject is perceived as something less than the human (white) 
norm and the hierarchical classification of humanity appears to be natural, the discursive 
translation of the actual ordering of the world.102 
The creation of racial blackness and its negative connotations inscribed on the skin 
has played a crucial role in the construction of Western modernity and represents the very 
basis of the United States as a nation. The production and reproduction of classificatory 
and stereotypical figures have a long history with roots in the European imperialist project 
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and the Atlantic slave trade. The visual representation of black subjects as degraded 
human beings had a fundamental role in maintaining power relationship; as Barret states, 
“[…] the scopic is a preeminent cultural matrix of power and order.”103 Throughout the 
centuries, the stereotypical images and their related meanings developed, according to the 
changing social order that needed to be maintained; however, as Hartman argues, there is 
an “amazing continuity” in the “injurious constitution of blackness,”104 whose aim is to 
give a supposedly rational explanation to racism and subjugation, both in the past and in 
today’s US society. 
The final part of the chapter will address the historical construction of the visual 
archive of race, starting from the Enlightenment period and with a specific focus on the 
stereotypes of blackness that originated during slavery and the ways in which they 
survived and developed after emancipation. 
 
5.1. Enlightenment and scientific racism 
The visual representation of human difference and the idea of an existing racial 
hierarchy becomes popular and widely accepted starting from the Enlightenment era. In 
their effort to classify human knowledge according to supposedly ‘rational’ principles, 
Enlightenment thinkers were the first to organize human diversity systematically in 
hierarchical terms. In order to do so, they applied the new paradigm of natural history, 
that was first conceived for the classification of plants and animals, to humankind itself. 
Therefore, during the Enlightenment period, elaborated concepts of race began to be 
developed and the inherent difference among ‘human species’ started to be perceived as 
an incontrovertible scientific truth that was mainly based on visual evidence.105 It is in 
this period that the Enlightenment thought about the hierarchical order of races based on 
a supposed purity, replaces previous notions that served to justify the oppression and 
enslavement of black people, such as Boemus’ biblical theory of the curse of Ham.106  
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These ideas about racial purity based on a new kind of scientific evidence were also 
perceived as aesthetic criteria that linked the superiority of the white race to the standards 
of beauty of classical art. While white people were perceived as the pinnacle of the human 
race that carried a symbolic sense of aesthetic superiority, other races were often 
compared to animals and reduced to inherent inferiority and bestiality. At the mundane 
level, in popular representations, ideas about the racial superiority of white people were 
supported by images that created the association between white skin and purity, 
cleanness, civilization and beauty; in the same way, dark skin was linked to dirtiness, 
primitivity and barbarism.107  
The concept of race developed in the eighteenth century took hold in the nineteenth 
century in the theorization of scientific racism, a field of study that was inextricably 
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bound to the technological innovations that characterized this century. Nineteenth-
century racist thought, though it continued the tradition intertwining science and 
aesthetics to explain racial superiority, was more concerned with proving the inherent 
biological difference through measurable distinctions (Fig. 1). Scientific racism included 
a wide range of disciplines, such as phrenology, craniology, anthropometry and genetics 
whose goal was to provide scientific ground to the visual evidence of the racial moral 
inferiority of blacks, that was inscribed in their body, in their very physical 
characteristics.108 
Integral to the project of scientific racism to explain racial difference in visual 
terms, is the exhibition of real black people, who were presented as the embodiment of 
Otherness and difference. The most famous case is that of the African woman Saartje 
Baartman, who was also ironically known as “The Hottentot Venus” (Fig. 2). This 
exhibition of the racialized body was perceived at the popular level as an actual “racial 
spectacle”, reproduced in cartoons and illustrations, but gave also the possibility to the 
proponents of scientific racism to demonstrate her racial inferiority by measuring and 
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scrutinizing every detail of her body, which came to represent the proof of her absolute 
otherness as well as the indisputable separation of races.109 
As already noted, scientific racism relied heavily on technological innovations, and 
especially photography played a crucial role in creating and disseminating the visuality 
of racial differentiation. The power of photography resides in the fact that it was perceived 
as a “neutral” instrument that only registers how reality actually is. As McClintock 
argues: “[w]ith photography, Western knowledge and Western authority became 
synonymous with the real.”110 As matter of fact, photography has been used as a way to 
subjugate the black body and reduce the subject to a mere object and victim of the 
dominant white gaze. Fleetwood emphasizes how photographic technologies were crucial 
to “[…] assign racial categories and validate racist discourse about difference and 
biology. The indexing of racial subject through the photographic lens” was indeed a 
“method of enforcing violence and subjugation of certain groups”.111 
From this first analysis of the creation of the concept of race as something visible 
and natural, it should be clear that racism precedes the conceptualization of race. In other 
words, it is not because races exist that racism was possible, but the exact opposite. As 
Mitchell explains: 
[r]acism is the brute fact, the bodily reality, and race is the derivative term, devised either 
as an imaginary cause for the effects of racism or as an attempt to provide a rational 
explanation, a “realistic picture” and diagnosis of this mysterious syndrome known as 
racism. Race is not the cause of racism but its excuse, alibi, explanation, or reaction 
formation.112 
 
5.2. Plantation slavery 
While racialized ideologies based on scientific racism were mainly developed in 
Europe, they also played an important role for US society and the ways in which race was 
conceived and portrayed. The binary oppositions created within the colonialist and 
imperialist discourse served to justify the enslavement of millions of Africans, the 
Atlantic slave trade, as well as the institution of plantation slavery.  
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The basic and more powerful opposition was that between ‘Culture’ and ‘Nature’, 
which was visually inscribed in the color of the skin: white stands for superior intellectual 
development and civilization, whereas black is the mark of primitivism and savagery. It 
is therefore clear how visual discourse is inextricably linked to the production of 
racialized knowledge: the body itself became the “totemic object,”113 the visible symbol 
of difference and otherness and provided the evidence for the naturalization of racial 
differences. In other words, racialized knowledge is produced through the representation 
of difference that is inscribed on the real bodies of black people.114 
During slavery, at popular level, the naturalization of the racial hierarchy and the 
reproduction of racialized knowledge relied on the representation of blackness through a 
set of stereotypical images. The main feature of the racialized regime of representation 
that was constructed during slavery was its effort to depict the subordinate status of blacks 
as a natural condition that derived from innate and unmodifiable characteristics. 
According to Hall,  
[t]he logic behind naturalization is simple. If the differences between black and white 
people are cultural, then they are open to modification and change. But if they are natural 
- as the slaveholders believed - then they are beyond history, permanent and fixed. 
'Naturalization' is therefore a representational strategy designed to fix difference, and 
thus secure it forever.115 
Therefore, the main aim of stereotypical representations of black people was to 
secure and maintain relationships of power and dominion and justify the violence and 
oppression by making slavery appear as natural and inevitable.116  
Before moving to the analysis of these stereotypical representations, it is worth 
noting that stereotypes depicting black women differed from those created to subjugate 
black men. In general, controlling images of men aimed at the infantilization of the black 
male slave, who was deprived of his masculine attributes and authority. This portrayal 
was an integral part of the depiction of slavery as a patriarchal institution dominated by 
the white male slaveholder; as a consequence, black men were to be deprived of any form 
of authority or familial responsibility.117 As regards black women, their representations 
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were entirely centered around their sexuality and the need to control their fertility. 
According to the partus sequitur ventrem rule enforced under slavery, which assigned to 
the offspring the condition of the mother, women were the means through which slavery 
itself was reproduced, making the body of black women a crucial site of oppression based 
on both race and gender. 
 
Sambo 
The first and most enduring stereotype of the black man is the Sambo type, the docile, 
simple-minded, and childish black slave (Fig. 3). The Sambo stereotype was created as a 
defense for slavery, as it was the epitome of the “happy slave”, a jolly overgrown child 
who was happy to serve his master. The Sambo embodied the innate laziness of black 
slaves as well as their natural attitude to subordination and acceptance of dependency 
from the white master. As noted above, infantilization was a common and widespread 
representational strategy during slavery, because it helped to secure the position of the 
white male slaveowner as the only patriarchal authority.118 
 
Tom 
The Tom caricature, just as the Sambo stereotype, was born before the Civil War as 
a defense of slavery and contributed to an idealized and sentimentalized depiction of the 
life of the slaves. Tom represents the good, Christian and happily submissive house slave; 
he is happy to take care of his white masters and he is eager to serve. He was usually 
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Figure 3: The Sambo caricature 
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portrayed as an old man, physically weak, psychologically dependent on whites for 
approval. Tom’s submissive nature and loyalty to the white master is indefectible: even 
if he is “[…] chased, harassed, hounded, flogged, enslaved, and insulted, [he] keeps the 
faith, n'er turn against his white massas, and remains hearty, submissive, stoic, generous, 
selfless, and oh-so-very kind.”119 Tom is indeed the model slave, a non-threatening and 
reassuring image created for the white audience and that helped the establishment and 
maintaining of white supremacy.  
 
Mammy 
Mammy is the first controlling image created to enforce and maintain black 
women’s subordination under slavery. The mammy, a nurturing and loyal figure, is the 
female counterpart of the Tom, she is the faithful and obedient domestic servant (Fig. 4). 
Her depiction suggest that she loves her masters’ children and family even more than 
their own. According to Collins, the mammy is the symbol of the ideal black female 
relationship to dominant white male power; “[e]ven though she may be well loved and 
may wield considerable authority in her White family, the mammy still knows her ‘place’ 
as obedient servant. She accepted her subordination.”120 As noted above, control of 
sexuality played an important role in the creation of stereotypes of black women. The 
Mammy is the antithesis of the white standards of beauty, she is depicted as an 
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unattractive matronly figure whose sexuality is simply nonexistent. Because she was not 
seen as a sexual being, she could never represent a threat to the white woman; the Mammy 




The controlling power of the figure of the Jezebel works in opposition to the figure 
of the Mammy. While the Mammy is a decidedly asexual figure, the Jezebel is the 
portrayal of the hyper-sexualized and sexually aggressive black woman, who is perceived 
as if she is governed almost entirely by her libido.121 Under slavery, this kind of depiction 
mainly served to provide a justification for the widespread sexual abuses perpetrated by 
white males on black female slaves.  The Jezebel’s excessive appetites were also a 
rationale for controlling black women’s fertility and depicting black female slaves as 
breeders, rather than mothers, by claiming that black women were able to produce 
children “as easily as animals”. 122 The opposition between the Mammy and the Jezebel 
is the clear exemplification of the power that stereotypical representations have on the 
lives of the people that they pretend to portray. Black women are thus trapped within an 
inescapable binary opposition; the racialized regime of representation subjected black 
women to an extreme form of reductionism and depicts them as either oversexualized or 
asexual beings.123 
 
Starting from the early nineteenth century, these stereotypical images were brought 
to the white public, especially in the North, with the blackface minstrel shows that became 
increasingly popular over time and were still performed at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. In these shows, white performers darkened their faces with burnt cork and 
painted exaggerated white mouths over their own to create grotesque caricatures of black 
people.124 The stereotypical figures of the Sambo, the Mammy, the Tom, etc. were the 
main characters of minstrel shows and ultimately the images through which white 
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Americans learned how to see black people and the values attached to the idea of 
blackness itself. Minstrel shows were crucial in the creation and spreading of controlling 
images that were used first to obscure the oppressive relationship of power in the 
plantations, “[…] by pretending that slavery was amusing, right, and natural”125 and, after 
emancipation, to support the exclusion of black people from citizenship. What is more, 
the racist and oppressive practice of blackface became the visual repertoire through which 
white people learned how to see black people as inherently inferior, trapped in a few and 
essential traits. These controlling stereotypical images were also found on a myriad of 
everyday objects, as well as magazine illustrations, advertising campaigns, books, etc. 
Ultimately, white Americans learned how to see race itself through these stereotypes, thus 
building a highly racialized knowledge that defined not only the rules and boundaries of 
a degraded blackness, but that, at the same time, created a common sense of whiteness as 
superior.126 
 
5.3. Anti-slavery racial imagery 
While the basic “grammar of race” was learned at the popular level through the 
stereotypes constructed under slavery, it is worth noting that, in the same period, anti-
                                               
125 Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 2. 
126 Scacchi, “Mettere in scena la razza,” p. 51-52; Hartman S., Scenes of Subjection, p. 29. 
Figure 5: Josiah Wedgwood, “Am I Not a Man and 
a Brother?” (1787) 
 
Figure 6: McPherson & Oliver, “The 
Scourged Back” (1863) 
 41 
slavery campaigns offered a different representation of black people, though not less 
problematic. Indeed, the visual culture of the abolitionist movement confirmed in a 
paradoxical way the representations of black people produced to justify slavery about 
their innate submissive nature and their lack of independence. 127 
According to Trodd, the main characteristic of the visual culture of the abolitionist 
movement were paternalism, dehumanization, depersonalization and sensationalism; 
ultimately an iconography “[…] that heroizes the abolitionist liberator, minimizes slave 
agency, pornifies violence and indulges in voyeurism.”128 Anti-slavery visual culture, 
therefore relied on a sentimentalized version of the stereotyping that was centered around 
two main images, namely the supplicant slave and the scourged back.  
The supplicant slave (Fig. 5) with the famous ‘am I not a man and a brother’ slogan 
was a hugely popular symbol created by the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the 
Slave Trade. It was reproduced on every kind of object as a decorative feature. The figure 
reproduced is a passive black man kneeling and pleading for pity and compassion with 
his hands raised. It is the image of a non-threatening slave that suffers passively in chains 
and waits to receive his liberation, which will be generously bestowed by enlightened 
white men. The agency of the slave is completely denied and ultimately “[t]he image 
invites not solidarity with the enslaved but paternalistic association with the morally 
righteous abolitionists who will answer the helpless captive’s question by releasing his 
chains.”129 
A similar passivity can be found also in the second most common trope of antislavery 
visual culture, that is the image of the scourged back. Most famously, this image 
circulated in the nineteenth century as a daguerreotype which showed a slave, identified 
only by his name Gordon, with his back scarred from whippings (Fig. 6). In this photo, 
Gordon is not seen as an individual, but he is reduced to his tortured back that becomes 
the symbol of slavery’s violence inscribed in the slave’s body. The image is part of what 
has been called the abolitionist “pornography of pain,” where the black wounded body is 
a spectacle enabling the white viewer to show empathy and benevolence.130 
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5.4. After emancipation 
After the emancipation of the slaves in the United States in 1863, the most violent 
forms of physical exploitation and degradation were replaced by a different system of 
racial segregation, in which the problem of the color line and “the Negro question” 
remained central. Therefore, the stereotypical regime of representation that constructed 
the image of black people in the white imaginary, far from disappearing, persisted through 
representations of blackness that emerged from the basic stereotypes created during 
slavery131. As Hartman states, “tragic continuities” can be retraced in antebellum and 
postbellum constitutions of blackness as an abject and threatening condition, as  
[t]he abolition of slavery presumably announced the end of subjugation based on race or 
servitude, but the ascendancy of formal race - that is, immutable, inherent, and 
naturalized racial differences - perpetuated the stigma of inferiority based on race […]132 
Controlling the freed population, therefore, remained a crucial issue in the new US 
society. Representations of black womanhood still trapped black women in the binary 
opposition between the hyper-sexualized Jezebel and the asexual servant. It could be 
argued that the Mammy stereotype changed slightly after emancipation and was 
transfigured in the widespread figure of Aunt Jemima, who first became a character of 
minstrel shows and, at the end of the nineteenth century, helped market a real brand, 
which could be found in every American home, represented on every kitchen tool.133 Her 
iconography, although it changed over time, is entirely based on the attire and physical 
features of the Mammy; moreover, her strong link to the slavery period is marked by the 
term “aunt”, which had been a southern way to address older enslaved people. Just as the 
Mammy, Aunt Jemima is a loyal servant that is happy to cook for her white “family”, and 
it was through this stereotype that the association of the black woman with domestic 
work, especially cooking, became fixed in the American mainstream. 
While images of black womanhood varied only slightly, a new powerful image of the 
black man appeared after the emancipation, namely that of the savage brute. During 
slavery, the depiction of black men mainly focused on their need for guidance and simple 
                                               
131 Hall, Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, p. 250. 
132 Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, pp. 162-163. 
133 Scacchi, “Le figlie di Hagar.” 
 43 
mindedness to portray slavery itself as a patriarchal institution; in fact, the depiction of 
the black male as a brute would have been counterproductive for maintaining the social 
order. During the Reconstruction period, however, the idea that without the patriarchal 
control of slaveholders black men would resort to criminal savagery and violence, gained 
increasing popularity. The belief that the newly-emancipated blacks were a "black peril" 
continued into the early 1900s and, though it changed over time, the black male body is 
still perceived as threatening in contemporary US society. This figure of the black brute 
was based on imperialist theories about the savage from the Dark Continent and was 
depicted as a hyper-masculine and sexually insatiable beast. As already happened to black 
women, black manhood too could then be described in terms of the binary opposition 
between infantilization and hyper-sexuality. This new image of the black as a brute sexual 
predator encouraged the acts of racial violence perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan; as Hall 
argues: “[a]lleged rape was the principal justification advanced for the lynching of black 
men in the Southern states.”134   
 
5.5. The legacy of racial stereotypes in contemporary US society 
The racial imagery created during slavery continued to hold its power on the lives 
of black people throughout the twentieth century, even after the period of the Civil Right 
Movements and the achievement of a supposed equality. Representations of blackness in 
the new media, especially cinema, remained inextricably tied to preexisting stereotypes 
and the basic ‘grammar of race’ established during slavery.135 Moreover, it should be 
noted that this kind of racialized knowledge invested not only the representations of 
blackness, but also technological development itself. Both photography and cinema were 
not racially neutral, on the contrary, the film stock itself was developed to favor lighter 
skin tones, as color balance was based on white skin.136  
With regard to new stereotypes of black people, Collins argues that during the 
1960s a new controlling image of black womanhood emerged, namely the matriarch. She 
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is depicted as the “bad” black mother, the antithesis of the archetypal Mammy who was 
a nurturing and caring figure. Within the context of outspoken black activism that accused 
institutionalized racism for economic and social inequality, the figure of the matriarch 
was used by the dominant group to blame black women for their own condition of 
economic exploitation. Depicted as overly aggressive and unfeminine, the matriarch was 
indeed a failed mammy, a negative stigma for all the black women that were trying to 
reject the image of the submissive servant.137 In order to justify the economic 
disadvantage of blacks and the enduring racial hierarchy, dominant group created other 
class-specific controlling images, such as the “welfare mother” and the “black lady”138. 
As for black men, the stereotype that is probably more widespread in contemporary 
society is that of the “buck”, the brutal and hypersexualized man, a menacing figure that 
derives directly from the post-emancipation savage. In her famous essay about white 
paranoia, Judith Butler uses the Rodney King case to explain how powerful racial imagery 
about the inherently violent nature of black men is, as it enabled the defense attorney to 
use the video of King’s brutal beating to support his claim that the policemen were 
endangered.139 
In conclusion, what is important to underline and what Butler shows in her essay, 
is that it is necessary to understand race as a powerful visual cultural dynamic. Therefore, 
while the analysis of racial imagery is crucial, it is not enough. The focus must be on the 
act of seeing itself, in order to recognize the visual field as “a racial formation, an 
episteme, hegemonic and forceful.”140 What must be identified, are the ways in which the 
scopic regime of race makes us see human differentiation according to racial traits; while 
biological notions of race are completely discredited, it is still not possible to claim that 
race does not exist, as it still is a major component in the everyday life of people. As 
Barret argues, racial blackness, though biologically non existent, is nonetheless an 
existential reality.141 
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CHAPTER 2 




As seen in the first chapter, for the enforcement and maintenance of the US system of 
racial domination, control over representation and images has proven to be fundamental. 
Indeed, through the scopic regime of race, blackness has been constructed as an abject 
condition, which is perceived as inherently Other from the white unmarked norm. As 
already argued, while the analysis of the racial imagery constructed from slavery on is 
crucial, it is more important to focus on the act of seeing itself as a mediated activity 
which is informed by social and cultural constructions and that is at the center of 
dynamics of power and hegemony. Throughout the history of the United States, black 
people have been constructed as subjects of the white dominant gaze and have been 
denied the possibility to articulate their own subjectivity. This aspect is especially 
important with regards to the visual field, as African American have always been 
“disbarred from meaningful participation in the sense-making activity of vision” and have 
therefore perceived vision mainly as “a hostile realm of significance”.142  
While this chapter is concerned with “the oppositional gaze” and the ways in which 
black people have challenged and contested the dominant regime of representation by 
employing a wide range of counterstrategies, it should be noted that this issue is still 
highly problematic in today’s US society. As bell hook stated in her seminal 1992 essay 
Black Looks: Race and Representation, “[t]hat the field of representation remains a place 
of struggle is most evident when we critically examine contemporary representations of 
blackness and black people”. 143 In order to exemplify how a representation of blackness 
that is still informed by hegemonic white values affects the life of black people in the US, 
the feminist scholar tells an anecdote that “painfully reminded” her of this fact. While she 
was visiting friends, she realized how their preadolescent daughter, despite being raised 
in an affirming black context, had internalized the white gaze and its aesthetic, “a way of 
                                               
142 Lindon Barrett, Blackness and Value: Seeing Double, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p. 217. 
143 bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation, Boston: South End Press, 1992, p. 3. 
 46 
looking and seeing the world that negates her value”144, and how this caused enormous 
pain and rage in the little girl. Indeed, she had learned to accept hateful images of herself 
created by the power of the colonizing gaze that constructed and perpetuated black 
subjectivity from slavery on. This sufferance, the impossibility to control her image and 
to escape the colonized vision is an instance of W.E.B: Du Bois’ concept of double 
consciousness, that is the fact of seeing oneself through the frame of race constructed by 
the hegemonic gaze.145 
 
1.   Regaining power over identity 
In previous sections it has been argued that black identity is painfully marked by 
this inherent double consciousness that is also exemplified in the “Fanonian moment”, in 
which the white gaze petrifies and traps the black subject in an inescapable epidermal 
schema. However, this condition does not mean that the hegemonic gaze reduces the 
black subject to a passive victim. As a matter of fact, it is from this very condition that 
liberatory possibilities and the agency of black people can emerge. 146 
 
1.1. Second sight 
According to Du Bois, though learning to see oneself through the lens of the 
hegemonic gaze is a rather painful condition, it also enables the emergence of a collateral 
feature of black identity, what he called “second sight.”147 This concept is an integral part 
of the identity of blacks not only in the United States but all over the black diaspora in 
the Americas and also, to some extent, of all the oppressed minorities in the Western 
world. Even though it might seem contradictory, Du Bois conceived second sight as a 
kind of privileged position; indeed, the choice to define the concept itself “second sight” 
refers to the idea of clairvoyance, that is the ability to perceive matters beyond the range 
of ordinary perception. Therefore, even if it is the consequence of a painful state of things, 
second sight, i.e. the possibility to see how one is seen, gives black people the possibility 
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to gain an improved awareness about the visual construction of blackness as an abject 
condition.  
What is more, learning to see differently with second sight holds the possibility to 
acknowledge and uncover the power of the dominant white gaze and therefore to 
challenge and unsettle its authority. 148 In other words, it is precisely because black people 
learn to see themselves within the scopic regime of race as inherently racialized subjects 
that they can also gain access to a greater awareness of the mechanisms of dominant 
visuality and challenge them. On the contrary, as already noted, white people are taught 
to perceived themselves as the unmarked norm and as the standard of humankind; this 
privileged condition implies that whites mostly perceive the field of vision as a neutral 
space in which seeing human differences according to racial traits is naturalized.149 It is 
important to highlight that, differently from the concept of double consciousness, which 
refers more to a condition of impossible unity imposed on the black subject’s identity, 
through the idea of second sight Du Bois claims for himself an active and possibly 
powerful role, namely the role of the viewer.150 
 
1.2. The struggle over the gaze and the right to look 
Being in the position of the seeing subject means to be in a position of power that 
holds in itself the possibility to develop a resistant gaze. According to the Malian cultural 
theorist Manthia Diawara, “[e]very narration places the spectator in a position of agency”, 
as it is the subject who is asked to make sense of what is seen. It should be noted, however, 
that being the viewer does not necessarily mean being able to subvert the hegemonic gaze. 
Rather, as Diawara argues in his essays about black British cinema, being the spectator 
means that critical and oppositional ways of seeing might emerge in specific moments of 
“rupture” when the viewer interrogates and resists dominant discourses.151  
The awareness about the power of looking and of the privileged position of the viewer 
represent the foundation of the scopic regime of race in the US. As bell hooks poignantly 
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argues, under slavery the control of the gaze was one of the major strategies of domination 
that enabled the maintaining of racialized power relationships; indeed, the slaves were 
denied their right to the gaze and were punished for the very act of looking, as black 
looking was perceived as looking back.152  
Similarly, in his recent book The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality, 
Nicholas Mirzoeff states that slavery can also be conceived as “the removal from the right 
to look”. He also recalls how controlling the look of all the people that were classified as 
“colored” was still crucial under Jim Crow; simply looking at a white person, in particular 
a white woman or a person in authority, was considered outrageous and was actually 
forbidden as “reckless eyeballing”.153 According to Mirzoeff, visuality as a strategy of 
domination is the “exclusive claim to be able to look” that is deployed by authority to 
justify unequal power relationships and make them seem natural and right. The 
“monitoring of the look” and the policing of visuality can be retraced throughout the 
history of the United States and they can be conceived as an integral part of the nation’s 
identity. Indeed, Mirzoeff has identified three complexes of visuality that can be 
considered the foundation of modernity and that have provided a justification for the 
economic and cultural hegemony of the Western world: the first modality of visuality is 
“the plantation complex,” which naturalized racialization and human differentiation 
according to racial traits; the second modality is “the imperialist complex,” which 
organized a strict hierarchy of civilizations and, finally, the most recent is the modality 
of visuality deployed by “the military-industrial complex”. 154  
This concept of visuality as the supplement to authority is entirely comparable to the 
concept of scopic regime analyzed in the first chapter. However, in this chapter the focus 
is on how dominant modality of visuality has been contested and how the exclusive claim 
to make sense and organize reality has been challenged by resistant acts of 
countervisuality. It is in this sense that Mirzoeff conceptualizes “the right to look”: it is 
the inevitable emergence of claims of autonomy from the authority of the hegemonic 
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gaze. In other words, it is the attempt to reclaim one’s gaze and the power of the viewer 
that has always been denied this privileged position.155 
In the history of the United States, black people have always been the social group 
whose “right to look” has constantly been denied and repressed; however, as already 
stated, this condition did not prevent blacks from engaging in a longstanding fight to 
regain power over a hostile field of visuality that has created the inherent association 
between blackness and abjection.156 In fact, those who are subordinates in a relationship 
of power are well aware of the interplay between processes of racialization and the field 
of visuality and also of the fact that there is the possibility of agency and resistance even 
in the worst circumstances of domination. Agency and resistance to the hegemonic gaze 
emerge precisely from the fact that the long history of repression of black peoples’ right 
to look has produced “an overwhelming longing to look, a rebellious desire, an 
oppositional gaze”.157 For black people, developing an oppositional gaze, means to 
develop a way of seeing which can subvert the power of the colonizing image of 
blackness constructed from slavery on. In other words, the oppositional gaze enables to 
counter the dominant regime of representation that has constructed blackness through 
degrading stereotypical images and ultimately to resist the violence perpetrated by white 
representations of the black subject.  
In this resistance struggle, the power of the dominated lies in the possibility to speak 
against the hegemonic representation of blackness not only by pointing to and questioning 
the racist stereotypical archive through which blackness is perceived, but also by creating 
alternative and counterhegemonic images in order to challenge the scopic regime of race 
from within the field of vision.158 As bell hooks puts it,  
[…] the ability to manipulate one’s gaze in the face of structures of domination that 
would contain it, opens up the possibility of agency. […] Spaces of agency exist for 
black people, wherein we can both interrogate the gaze of the Other but also look back, 
at one another, naming what we see. The “gaze” has been and is a site of resistance for 
colonized black people globally.159 
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1.3. Contesting a racialized regime of representation 
Throughout this work, it has been underlined that control over visuality is 
fundamental in maintaining and justifying unequal relationships of power and racial 
dominion. This is why the realm of representation has been mainly seen by black 
Americans as a painful site of oppression; at the same time, however, it is important to 
highlight that it has always been a crucial site of resistance as well.160 Indeed, throughout 
the history of the United States, the fight over the control of visuality has constituted an 
actual “war of images”.161  
It is worth repeating that, while analyzing and speaking against racist 
representations of black people is still important nowadays, it is also true that this 
perspective alone might turn out to be problematic. Indeed, by adopting only this point of 
view, the black subject appears as just a passive victim of the hegemonic gaze while the 
longstanding struggle to seize black peoples’ right to look remains hidden. This is why a 
shift of focus towards black counternarratives and representation is equally important, as 
it enables to acknowledge the fact that black Americans have always resisted the violence 
of the hegemonic white gaze. In order to fight against the degrading and dehumanizing 
visual archive of blackness produced within the context of plantation slavery and 
scientific racism, black people have always reclaimed their own worth and humanity by 
producing alternative images of blackness. It is therefore clear how the issue of self-
representation and the possibility to construct a different kind of visuality have always 
been crucial to challenging the scopic regime of race and the stereotypical images in 
which black people were, and still are, inevitably trapped.162 
The possibility to challenge the degrading archive of blackness relies in the fact that 
the meanings that these representations claim to carry “can never be finally fixed.”163 
Indeed, as seen in the previous chapter, stereotyping is the attempt to create a fixed 
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association between the image and the degrading meaning that is attached to it. However, 
as Hall argues, counter-strategies emerge because  
ultimately, meaning begins to slip and slide; it begins to drift, or be wrenched, or 
inflected into new directions. New meanings are grafted on to old ones. Words and 
images carry connotations over which no one has complete control, and these marginal 
or submerged meanings come to the surface, allowing different meanings to be 
constructed, different things to be shown and said.164 
In order to challenge the scopic regime of race, blacks in the United States have 
employed a wide range of strategies and have engaged with dominant culture in different 
ways, depending on their individual power as well as on the social, cultural and political 
conditions.165 In the struggle to produce an alternative visuality, black people have been 
both the producers of images and the object of those images; in this last case, however, 
differently from the racist representations, they were not passive objects of the dominant 
gaze, but they managed to control and manipulate their own images for artistic or political 
purposes and to support their claims. Agency, therefore, is not only found in the active 
role of the viewer, but also in those situations in which the black subject is the object of 
sight.166  
In the next section I will deal with the strategies through which black people have 
rejected degrading representations and have reclaimed their right to construct their own 
identity. The focus will be on three of the most popular cases in the history of the United 
States between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, namely the strategies adopted by Sojourner Truth and Frederik Douglass to 
represent themselves and the work of Du Bois for the 1900 “American Negro” exhibition 
in Paris. After having analyzed these early proponents of alternative representations and 
self-representations of blackness, the strategies adopted by black Americans to resist 
stereotypical narratives will be discussed in more detail. Finally, the focus will shift to 
the ways in which in more recent times the racialized scopic regime has been contested 
by uncovering how race itself is constructed in the field of visuality; the overall idea, 
therefore is not to build an alternative archive that substitutes the dominant one, but to 
interrogate the very visual mechanisms that construct racialized subjects. 
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2.   Alternative representations of blackness between the 19th and early 20th 
century 
The visual struggle for black self-representation and the consequent war of images 
to counter dehumanizing depictions started with two crucial figures in the history of the 
United States, namely Fredrick Douglass and Sojourner Truth. Both former slaves that 
had gained freedom before the official abolition of slavery, they soon became two of the 
most known abolitionists and later activists for racial equality. They both came to be 
widely popular figures thanks to their political activity and their struggle to shape a 
different representation of blackness through their publications, especially through their 
autobiographies and their speeches. However, the element that characterized both Truth 
and Douglass that is most relevant for the present discussion is the way in which they 
engaged with the visual culture of their time. Through an extensive use of photography, 
they produced and promulgated their own self-representations and asserted their total 
control over their own images and the meanings that were attached to them. Indeed, the 
photographs portraying them contributed to the deconstruction of hegemonic 
representations of black masculine and feminine subjectivities.167   
As seen in the first chapter, photography was a fundamental tool for providing a 
“rational” basis to the emerging scientific racism and many studies have analyzed 
photography’s repressive function and the role it played in the depiction of blackness as 
an abject condition.168 However, photography, both in antebellum and postbellum 
America was also used by black people as a means of self-representation, as well as a 
political tool and a way to support emerging social and legal claims. As Maurice Wallace 
and Michelle Shawn Smith argue in the introduction of their collection of essays Pictures 
and Progress: Early Photography and the Making of African American Identity, 
photography from very early on has played a crucial role for African American cultural 
and political life and black people engaged with “this new technology of representation 
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to perform identities and to shape a dynamic visual culture.” 169 Therefore, for black 
Americans, photography was a way to produce an alternative visual archive and 
throughout the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the use of 
photography as a mode of self-determination and self-representation grew steadily. As 
Fleetwood puts it in her study about racial icons, 
many black Americans […] saw promise in photography to produce a visual record of 
humanity that had been denied them in most spheres of American life. The medium also 
served as an important counterpoint for the dehumanizing imagery of slaves and black 
citizens that had been used to reinforce the racial state.170 
 
2.1.  Sojourner Truth 
Sojourner Truth was a former slave who became an abolitionist and a women’s 
right activist and whose image in the nineteenth century was a familiar presence to 
millions of viewers throughout the United States. It has been thoroughly argued that a 
huge part of her power and her popularity as a spokesperson for emancipation and racial 
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equality was to be found in her visual presence and in the ways in which she was able to 
manipulate her image to shape her identity and support her social and political claims.171 
During her political activism, Truth used to sell her carte de visite (Figure 7) which 
portrayed her as a middle-class matron according to nineteenth century visual parameters 
of femininity. The image on the cards shows her awareness of the power of photography 
for representational purposes. On the one hand, through the rhetoric of the pose, the 
respectable middle-class attire, and the gender-appropriate activity and dress she was able 
to construct an image of herself that reproduced “all the visual signifiers of nineteenth-
century genteel and domestic femininity”172, thus distancing herself from stereotyped 
representation of black women constructed and perpetuated by dominant white society. 
On the other hand, however, other signs do not comply with the canonical visual code, 
most significantly her own gaze that, far from being submissive, is indeed confrontational 
and engages the viewer directly, showing her resolution and self-awareness in the struggle 
for emancipation and equality. As Mirzoeff argues, in these portrayals “Truth rejected the 
slaver’s gaze by claiming the right to be seen as human”.173 Therefore, Truth managed to 
escape racialized depiction, as she used photography “to embody and empower herself, 
to present the images of herself that she wanted remembered,”174 and ultimately to assert 
both her “right to look” and her right to be seen. 
The recurring caption “I Sell the Shadow to Support the Substance” highlights her 
condition as a newly emancipated woman; while during her enslavement her real body 
was an object to be sold and violated, after liberation she not only regained control over 
her own physical body, but she was also able to consciously objectify it through 
photography and even sell her image to support her campaigns and political activities.175 
It is therefore clear how deeply Sojourner Truth understood the power of the visual 
medium and its liberatory and empowering possibilities for black self-representation; 
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indeed, through photography Truth resisted racial stereotypes, constructed an alternative 
image over which she had total control, and conveyed her political and social claims. 
 
2.2. Frederick Douglass  
In the same period, also Frederick Douglass, one of the most prominent African 
American authors and abolitionists of the nineteenth century, understood the great 
potentiality of photography and made an extensive use of this new technology to create 
new spaces for his self and the black community in his struggle for emancipation and 
equality.176 The figure of Douglass is one of the most analyzed in the context of African 
American studies, as he was not only an activist and an orator, but he also managed to 
educate himself after having escaped from slavery and became a full rounded intellectual 
and writer.  
Most notably, he is considered an early visual theorist, as he wrote extensively 
about the advent and the power of photography for the issue of black representation. He 
firmly believed that “photography had the potential of humanizing slaves in the eyes of 
white American public” and that it was crucial “as a mode of self-determination for blacks 
individually and collectively.”177 According to Douglass, therefore, through photography 
black people had the possibility to challenge white misrepresentations of blackness; 
photography enabled to assert black peoples’ humanity against dehumanizing caricatures 
produced by pro-slavery societies, against theories about the “natural” abjection of black 
bodies claimed by scientific racism, as well as against white abolitionist imagery that 
paradoxically reinforced ideas about the submissive nature of blacks.178  
In his theories about the empowering possibilities offered by the new technology179, 
Douglass was particularly concerned with its inherent connection to realism; he believed 
that, through photography, it was possible to achieve “authentic images of blacks, rather 
than caricatures.”180 Photography, then, could be used as a crucial tool to “unraveling the 
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problem of racist representation”181 and to produce an alternative archive of images 
depicting the reality of authentic black people. Therefore, according to Douglass, the 
truthfulness of daguerreotype and photography prevented distortions of blacks that came 
from white representation. Another aspect that Douglass found particularly interesting 
and empowering about photography was its accessibility to ordinary people, thus making 
this technology an “ubiquitous and seemingly universal tool of self-representation.”182 
Douglass not only theorized the potential of photography for the empowerment of 
black people and as a source for racial uplift, but he also put his theoretical work into 
practice by sitting for dozens of portraits from early 1840s to 1895. These series of 
portraits represent his struggle over self-determination, as through the photographs he 
strategically visualizes his journey from slave to orator and political leader.183 As seen 
with Sojourner Truth, he used to give away his portraits during the lectures that he held    
throughout his life as a constant and “material reminder of his presence.”184  
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Because Douglass was fully aware that his photographs circulated in a contested 
visual culture, where blackness was mainly associated to abjection, he carefully crafted 
his image and as a black abolitionist he sought to objectify himself as a source of power 
and as an aid in his reform work.185 
Like Truth, in his portrayals, Douglass conformed to the conventions of nineteenth-
century photographic portraiture, namely the formal attire, the three-quarter bust and the 
austere gaze. His image stands in clear contrast with racist and dehumanizing 
representations of black people; while racist stereotypes depicted black manhood as a 
condition of inherent subjugation and lack of independence, Douglass created the image 
of a black leader, his austere gaze directed toward the viewer and his serious facial 
expression highlighting his claim for self-possession and rejection of the objectifying 
gaze. As Fleetwood has argued, by conforming to the convention of the genre and era, 
Douglass strategically used photography to assert his respectability, which was a crucial 
demand and a widespread political strategy adopted by black Americans both before and 
after emancipation.186  
 
2.3. W.E.B. Du Bois’s photographs for the 1900 Paris Exposition  
As it has been argued in the first chapter, according to Du Bois, who had theorized 
the concept of double consciousness, black subjectivity was mainly constructed within 
the field of visuality. Like Douglass and Truth, also Du Bois was fully aware of the 
importance of constructing an anti-racist visual archive that could challenge stereotypical 
and racist representations produced by the hegemonic white American culture. However, 
differently from the two abolitionists, he used photography not only as a means for 
combating racism by presenting alternative representations of black Americans, but also 
as a way to problematize the question of race itself.  
For the Universal Exposition that was held in Paris in 1900, Du Bois assembled a 
collection of more than 300 photographs of black Americans, taken mainly by unknown 
photographers, for the “American Negro” exhibit. In general, the aim of the collection of 
photographs was that of combating racism with empirical evidence of the economic, 
social, and cultural conditions of blacks in the US, by highlighting various aspects of 
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African Americans’ lives, including business enterprises, social life, and education. Du 
Bois firmly believed that a clear revelation of the facts of African American life and 
culture would challenge the claims of scientific racism, which proposed that black people 
were inherently inferior to whites. Indeed, the photographs of black men and women 
challenged both the scientific “evidence” and popular racist caricatures of the day that 
ridiculed and sought to diminish black peoples’ social and economic success.187 
Therefore, it might be argued that the collection of photographs had the power to “disrupt 
the image of African Americans produced ‘through the eyes of the others’ by 
simultaneously”188 providing an alternative and realist archive of blacks in the United 
States.  
However, in her essay about the exhibition, Shawn Michelle Smith points out the fact 
that part of the photos collected by Du Bois aimed also at “critically engage viewers in 
the visual and psychological dynamics of ‘race’ at the turn of the century.”189 In particular, 
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she refers to the numerous paired portraits of full-face and profile headshots (Figures 9 
and 10) and claims that their aim was to interrogate and challenge dominant white 
perceptions about “negro criminality” that were indeed widespread in turn-of-the-century 
US political and social discourses. 
Smith argues that these photographs bear a striking resemblance with both criminal 
mugshot and middle-class portraits, as they replicate their formal style and visual codes.  
Building on the theory of Signifyin(g)190 by Henry Louis Gates and adapting it to the 
domain of visuality, she claims that Du Bois’s photographs interrogate directly the white 
dominant visuality and suggest that “for some white viewers the portrait of an African 
American is ideologically equivalent to the mugshot of a criminal.”191 Moreover, the 
photographs implicitly expose the dependence of middle class white identity and cultural 
legitimacy on the opposite image of the criminal black other. In other words, the 
photographs signify upon images of both middle-class white subjects and criminal 
offenders by reproducing the formal characteristics of both criminal mugshot and middle- 
class portraits “with a difference”, thus challenging the white hegemonic gaze and 
enabling alternative interpretations of the images.192 
It is worth noting that for Du Bois the issues of representation and photography are 
highly influenced by the concept of black peoples’ double consciousness, that is by the 
idea that unity for the black subject is impossible to reach, as every black person is taught 
to see himself/herself through the eyes of the dominant white gaze. On the other hand, 
Douglass’ approach to photography is almost opposite; indeed, the capacity of humans to 
objectify themselves in images and to see themselves as other see them is conceived in a 
positive way. As Wallace and Smith argue,  
[w]hereas Du Bois would emphasize the power of racism to distort the self-image of 
African Americans, Douglass imagined a much more autonomous African American 
viewer, seeking progress and improvement through a study of the self-objectified as 
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image. In Douglass’s account, African Americans are the primary and most important 
viewers of their own images.193 
 
3.   Counterstrategies and their limitations 
Throughout the twentieth century, in the US context, the question of representation 
gained increasing importance. This was mainly the consequence of the emergence and 
the fast growth in popularity of new media, like cinema and television as well as of the 
rapidly changing social condition of black Americans that were struggling to reclaim their 
right to self-determination, their space in all contexts of US society and to assess their 
agency over their own lives and the ways in which they wanted to be seen.194 After the 
analysis of early attempts to create alternative images of blackness in the previous section, 
it should be clear how the fight over the realm of visuality and representation lies at the 
very core of the US national identity. Moreover, it shows how the traditional and 
hegemonic production of racial blackness has always been contested with alternative 
representations. As Herman S. Gray argues,   
[g]enerated from within black artistic, intellectual, and popular spheres, these black 
counternarratives and representations might be seen as a rejoinder to the various 
conservative attempts to demonize, regulate, define, and contain blackness […]. 195  
Of course, the ways in which black Americans have engaged and challenged 
dominant racialized images have varied widely, since the social, cultural and political 
contexts have deeply influenced the strategies that have been adopted. It is also worth 
highlighting that alternative representations are not liberatory per se and do not necessary 
hold counterhegemonic possibilities; in fact, they might share much with discourses of 
regulation and ultimately turn out to be counterproductive or at least not subversive.196 
The next sections of this paragraph will provide a theoretical introduction on the 
importance of realism and authenticity as representational counterstrategies adopted by 
black Americans and the debate over positive and negative images by also addressing 
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critiques and highlighting the limitations of these approaches. Then, the focus will shift 
to the ways in which blacks have engaged and resisted hegemonic culture by either 
accepting the stereotypes, adapting the stereotype to their own use or opposing the 
stereotype through parody and irony. Finally, the analysis will move to how 
contemporary black American artists, rather than providing alternative self-representation 
have directly challenged the realm of visuality itself. 
 
3.1. Realism and authenticity 
One of the most relevant strategies employed by black Americans to combat 
stereotypical racist images relies on the concepts of realism and truth. The overall idea is 
that the stereotypes produced by the scopic regime of race through which ideas of 
blackness are conveyed can be challenged by appealing to an “esthetic of 
verisimilitude.”197 A realist approach presuppose a vision that comes “from within” the 
black community and aims at highlighting the untruthful nature of racist caricatures and 
at substituting them with alternative representations that show the reality of black people 
and the truth of black experience.198 
The representational strategy that had as its main focus realism emerged within black 
people and cultural producers in the United States very early on, even before 
emancipation. As seen in the previous section, correcting racist images with more 
accurate ones was indeed the main goal of Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, and 
W.E.B. Du Bois; they wanted to show how unreal hegemonic representations were and 
substitute them with a completely opposite idea of what being black actually meant. As 
important as this strategy has been in the history of black Americans to challenge the 
racial order, however, this realistic approach that aims at representing an alleged “black 
authenticity” carries also huge limitations, as many scholars have shown.   
As Shoaht and Stam have argued in their study about black representation in cinema, 
the concepts of realism and truthfulness of representation are themselves inherently 
flawed. On the first level of analysis, the appeal to authenticity that lies at the core of the 
realist approach implies that there is an authentic blackness that should be the object of 
                                               
197 Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, “Stereotype, Realism and the Struggle over Representation,” in 
Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 178. 
198 Gray, “Black Cultural Politics and Commercial Culture.” 
 62 
representations. However, it is clear how this might turn out to be problematic, as 
blackness is not a monolithic experience and it is impossible for a single representation 
to claim for “authenticity”. In other words, the concept of authenticity “with its implicit 
appeal to verisimilitude as a kind of ‘gold standard’”199 is exclusionary, as it denies the 
validity of other kinds of counterhegemonic representations and claims to mirror an 
unquestionable reality and to get at “the truth of black experience.”200  
On a second level of analysis, Shohat and Stam, by taking from the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin about artistic representation, question the concepts themselves of “reality” and 
“truth”. According to the two scholars, countering objectifying hegemonic 
representations with a vision of black reality from within is problematic as “‘[r]eality’ is 
not self-evidently given and ‘truth’ is not immediately ‘seizable’”201 by representation. 
This means that there is not a transparent connection between reality and representations; 
indeed, there is no genuine “reality” at all, since we, as humans do not come into contact 
directly with the real, but “rather through the medium of the surrounding ideological 
world.”202 In the words of Wahneema Lubiano, “[r]eality, after all, is merely something 
that resounds in minds already trained to recognize it as such.”203 It is therefore clear how 
a naïve appeal to realism does not take into account the fact that total realism is a 
theoretical impossibility, as representation, far from being a transparent mirror of reality, 
is socially and historically mediated. 
3.2. Positive and negative images 
In the struggle for the control of visuality, counterhegemonic strategies based on 
realism and accuracy have mainly lead to the desire to substitute a range of positive 
images of blackness for the negative racist stereotypes that have dominated US culture. 
In what has been described as the debate over “negative/positive images”, the only way 
to resist racist degrading depictions is by producing entirely positive images of black 
people to replace the racist archive.204  
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This idea of “getting images of blacks ‘right’”205 has been of particular importance 
in the mobilization against dominant visual representations of blacks throughout the 
twentieth century. Privileging this corrective strategy based on a sort of “progressive 
realism” depended hugely on US social context. The causes of the fixation on producing 
positive images can be traced back to the nineteenth century: in their struggle for freedom 
and, after emancipation, in their fight to be recognized as equal citizens, black people 
have always been asked to prove their worth by demonstrating that they could meet the 
“white standards” imposed by society.206 By erasing the longstanding history of slavery 
and institutionalized racism, therefore black people have always been expected “to be 
better […] in order to be [considered] equal.”207 This condition explains why among the 
black community there has always been a strong need to construct and present positive 
images adhering to white middle class codes.  
On a more theoretical level, insistence on positive images is also explained by the fact 
that black people and black cultural producers are well aware of carrying “the mark of 
the plural”208, thus making their representation, either positive or negative, charged with 
collective meaning, as if black Americans could be considered a homogeneous 
community. This burden of representation is what Michael Rogin calls the “surplus 
symbolic value of blacks”209, a condition that is shared by all oppressed social groups and 
that makes very difficult for black people to escape the dynamics of positive/negative 
images.  
According to Hall, the positive aspect of this strategy lies in the fact that it might 
contribute to the expansion of the range of racial representations and highlight the 
complexity of black experience in the US as a way to challenge the reductionism of earlier 
stereotypes. However, it could be argued that this approach, while it may help to increase 
diversity of the ways in which blackness is represented, does not actually subvert the field 
of representation, because  
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it does not necessarily displace the negative [imagery]. Since the binaries remain in 
place, meaning continues to be framed by them. The strategy challenges the binaries - 
but it does not undermine them.”210 
Moreover, positive images are themselves stereotypical representations of blackness 
that elide the natural differences which are in fact part of any social group. Therefore, this 
strategy ultimately means to substitute negative stereotypes with more, even if “positive”, 
stereotypical images. In the words of Shohat and Stam, “[a] cinema in which all the Black 
characters resembled Sydney Poitier might be as much a cause for alarm as one in which 
they all resemble Step’n’Fetchit.”211 
3.3.  Confronting mass culture 
The predominance of strategies of self-representation based on progressive realism 
and on the production of positive stereotypes has acted as a kind of imposed censorship, 
as it did not allow for the emergence of alternative, and not necessarily positive, images 
of blackness. However, this does not mean that throughout the history of the United States 
black people, cultural producers and performers did not engage and confront hegemonic 
culture in different ways. Hall has indeed identified three ways in which it is possible to 
engage “the dominant cultural order” and the seemingly natural meanings that it 
imposes.212  
Accepting the stereotype 
The first possibility, namely “the dominant hegemonic decoding” implies the 
internalization of the dominant culture’s norms and values and therefore the acceptance 
of the stereotype. To this modality of engaging hegemonic representations can be traced 
all the strategies focusing on progressive realism and the construction of positive images. 
Indeed, as already seen, these strategies do not challenge racist representations directly 
and, ultimately, remain within the binary of dominant white visuality. 213  
Of particular importance for this approach is the politics of respectability, which has 
been used, and still is, one of the major representational strategy, deployed especially by 
black women. As seen in the first chapter, dominant representations of black women from 
slavery on have always revolved around the need to control their body and their sexuality. 
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The black female body is a site of extreme racialization and sexualization and it “set[s] 
the boundaries around which idealized white femininity is understood and visualized.”214 
Black women, within the field of visuality, are therefore trapped in the binary opposition 
that either negates their sexuality in the Mammy stereotype or portrays the excessive 
sexual appetite of the Jezebel.  
In order to resist dominant culture’s claims about the visibility and the excessiveness 
of the black female body, black women have adopted from very early on an aesthetic 
practice and a representational politics that are based on the concepts of dissemblance 
and respectability. These kinds of self-representational strategies, which became 
widespread among black women between the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, were based on modesty and the negation of sexuality 
as a way to claim black female dignity against dominant stereotypes. By employing the 
politics of respectability and the culture of dissemblance black women implicitly accepted 
negative stereotypes about black womanhood and tried to construct alternative and 
positive images of themselves that conformed and adhered to white middle-class codes 
and values.215 However, it should be noted that it was never a passive acceptance of the 
white standard of “true womanhood”, but a way to take control over their own image and 
body and to take advantage from their marginal position within US society. 216 As Patricia 
Hill Collins argues, “silence is not to be interpreted as submission;”217 indeed, through 
the politics of respectability, black women managed to transform the visibility imposed 
on them by hegemonic culture into a self-chosen and conscious invisibility from which 
they could act also as activists and be part of the social change.218  
This kind of representational strategy has been of crucial importance well into the 
period of the civil rights movement and is still today employed by many black women, 
since negative stereotypes about black womanhood, though they have evolved over time, 
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are still far from being eradicated.219 It should also be noted, however, that the politics of 
respectability has also been strongly criticized, as it denies and attempts to censor other 
forms of black female self-representation. Black scholars such as Evelyn Hammonds, 
have highlighted how the practices of silence and respectability deployed by black women 
to counter “the penetrating gaze of dominant visual culture”220 have also played a crucial 
role in maintaining black female marginalization. Moreover, in the contemporary context 
of the protests against police brutality, movements like #BlackLivesMatter have pointed 
to the unproductivity of these strategies for the current political struggle and have 
highlighted how, in fact, respectability claims are frequently used as a tool to delegitimize 
black rage.221 
 
Adapting the stereotype 
In other circumstances, black Americans, as well as other oppressed groups, have 
employed the strategy of negotiation. As with the first strategy, hegemonic culture and 
its codes are acknowledged and not directly questioned; however, negotiation “contains 
a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements.”222 Through negotiation it is possible to 
accept the stereotype and, at the same time, adapt it to one’s specific needs. Negotiation 
is indeed a strategy that has often proved to be crucial for black cultural producers and 
performers, as it has enabled them to subvert and signify upon the racist caricatural role 
imposed on them. As Scacchi argues, for example, while the practice of blackface is seen, 
and indeed is, the epitome of the racist degrading stereotypes of racial blackness and 
strictly linked to the production of controlling images, it has also enabled many black 
performers to find their space as artists.223 In fact, the practice of black blackface was 
widely popular also among the black public, and, even though black performers were 
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constricted within specific roles, it was also a way to express their creativity and make a 
living out of their artistic practice. 
Similarly, Donald Bogle in his study about African American performers in cinema 
has highlighted the agency of black actors in appropriating the performance to their own 
ends. He claims that, even though early Hollywood cinema has contributed to the 
perpetration of racist stereotypes, both black performers and the black audience were well 
aware of the difference between the role played and the actor.224 As a consequence, black 
actors and actress managed “to turn demeaning roles into resistant performance.”225 It is 
within this perspective that even the entirely caricatural and racist role of Mammy 
performed by Hattie McDaniel in the famous movie Gone with the Wind could hold 
liberatory possibilities: on the one hand, in her stereotypical attitude and in her way of 
looking Scarlett right in the eye the black audience could read hostility towards the racist 
US society; on the other hand, McDaniel could perform a racist role and at the same time 
take advantage from it, as she clearly argued in her well-known statement: “I’d rather 
make 700 dollars a week playing a maid than earn 7 dollars a day being a maid.”      
 
Opposing the stereotype 
The third and equally important representational strategy deployed by black people 
in the United States to resist the hegemonic visuality is opposition.226 Differently from 
acceptance and negotiation, adopting this strategy implies the refusal of dominant codes 
and, mainly through irony and parody, the appropriation of the stereotype to subvert 
hegemonic visuality and to resist racialized representations. As Gray states, over the 
centuries, “African Americans [have] continually appropriate[ed] images and 
representations […] in order to reconstitute themselves and therefore transgress the 
cultural and social locations that constantly attempt to contain and police them.”227 In 
particular, the practice of ironic appropriation of the negative stereotype has proven to be 
crucial, as it has enabled the black performer to point with irreverence to the precarious 
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and constructed nature of dominant white representations, especially of the racial 
stereotype.228  
Through ironic appropriation black artists, performers, and cultural producers in 
general have taken stereotypical images constructed by hegemonic visuality and 
subverted the negative meaning attached to them. This strategy has been used in particular 
by black female artists who adopted “excessive performance style […] to undercut and 
parody stereotypical roles”229 and who did not want to conform to the politics of 
respectability. Indeed, in total opposition with the widespread cultural imperative in black 
communities to negate sexuality and de-emphasize the black female body, many black 
female artists have embraced the extreme sexualization associated with the black body 
and used it in shocking and unpredictable ways. In particular, black female performers 
have engaged “the long and often brutal history of visually documenting and framing the 
black female body”230 by appropriating the image of “the Hottentot Venus”, the icon of 
the colonialist hegemonic gaze. The most famous black artist that has appropriated the 
image of the black Venus is probably Josephine Baker (fig. 11), who during the 1920s, 
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Figure 11: Josephine Baker, 1927 
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through her overtly exaggerated and ironic performances, ironized on white fantasies of 
black female savagery and exoticism projected over her black body.231  
In contemporary US culture, black female artists are still using irony, overt 
exaggeration, and parody to subvert and redress dominant representations of the black 
female body that is still nonetheless strictly associated with racist stereotypes. For 
example, much of the photographic work of the Jamaican American artist Renée Cox 
revolves around the idea of the female body as inherently excessive and hypervisible; she 
uses the image of her overtly exaggerated sexuality and her naked body to reclaim the 
black woman’s subjectivity from the dominant gaze, thus engaging and opposing “the 
marginalization and objectification of racialized bodies in Western visual culture.”232 The 
appropriation of stereotypes is also a crucial self-representation strategy for contemporary 
hip-hop artists, such as Lil’ Kim and Niki Minaj to assert their control over their own 
body and their sexuality and ultimately to transform longstanding images of black female 
sexual degeneration into subversive and self-empowering tools.233 
As Scacchi notes, however, the ironic appropriation of racial stereotypes enacted 
through performance is far from being unproblematic. Indeed, while contemporary 
debates on these kinds of racial performances focus on the conscious use of racist images 
for the artists’ auto-determination, the actual possibility for black artists to separate 
themselves from the degrading racial archive through irony and parody is questionable.234 
As a matter of fact, within US society racism is still very much a painful reality and black 
bodies are still subject to racist depictions, exploited and even killed on a daily basis.  
 
4.   Unmasking the scopic regime of race 
Within the context of US society, oppressed groups like black Americans throughout 
the last two centuries have been constantly struggling over the issues of race and 
representation. Through a wide range of strategies black people have contested the 
hegemonic white gaze. However, over the last decades there has been a shift of focus on 
the issues of race and representation from “the war of images” to the field of visuality 
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itself. Indeed, black scholars and cultural producers have claimed for a politics of 
representation that critically interrogates the realm of white visuality and that moves 
beyond mere contests over positive/negative images or the displacement of stereotyped 
depiction of African Americans in visual culture.235 
4.1. The limits of representation 
According to Nicole Fleetwood, despite all the strategies deployed to resist degrading 
images and the constant struggle to construct empowering self-representations, visuality 
remains a hostile field for black Americans. This state of things derives from the fact that 
it is visuality itself, through the scopic regime of race, that has structured blackness and 
the black body as inherently troubling. As she puts it, “the visual sphere has been 
understood […] as a punitive field – the scene of punishment – in which the subjugation 
of blacks continues through the reproduction of denigrating racial stereotypes […].”236 As 
a consequence, since seeing blackness is always and already a problem within the field 
of vision and the black body is always charged with inescapable racial markings, it is not 
possible to believe that “representation itself will resolve the problem of the black body 
in the field of vision.”237  
If, on the one hand, visuality has been a way for black people to “enter history without 
words,”238 on the other hand the very system of racial inequality has been constructed also 
through visuality. Therefore, it is clear how positive, realistic, and “authentic” images of 
blackness, while important, cannot be the solution for the issue of racialized 
representation, as they do not interrogate the concept of race itself, but rather they can 
just be used to substitute a racist archive with an alternative one.  
It is necessary, then, to shift the focus from the issues of images to the field of visuality 
as a whole; the idea is to challenge the scopic regime of race itself by showing and 
uncovering the visual mechanisms through which human differentiation, racialized 
subjects and the black/white polar opposition are constructed.239 In other words, because 
within the scopic regime of race the practices of looking and interpreting reality through 
an inherently racist ideology are made to seem natural and inevitable, the solution for the 
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issue of race and representation would be to interrogate the act of seeing itself and remove 
the veil of naturalization of human difference. 
4.2. Showing seeing 
Interrogating the visuality of race and attempting to denaturalize it has been a major 
concern for many contemporary artists. However, within the academic field, there has 
also been considerable interest in investigating the ways in which the visually constructed 
nature of race and “the permeability of the color line”240 have emerged in the past, too, 
for example in the practice of blackface. For a very long time, the performative practice 
of blackface, has been analyzed only as a thoroughly degrading performance that 
contributed to the diffusion at a popular level of images of abject blackness and ultimately 
as a way to secure white privilege after emancipation and to reaffirm racial hierarchies. 
However, as Scacchi argues, blackface has been a complex phenomenon that has been 
used by both black and white performers in different ways. In particular, from the point 
of view of the visuality of race, the practice of blackface, especially blackface performed 
by black actors became paradoxically a way to show the inherently performative nature 
of race.241 In other words, blacked-up black artists, through their double blackness, rather 
than affirming the unescapable distinction between races, which was the original goal of 
blackface minstrelsy, demonstrated how race itself was in fact a theatrical and entirely 
visual construction.  
Another example of attempts to denaturalize the visuality of race in the past is 
provided by Smith’s reading of W.E.B. Du Bois’s photographs for the 1900 “American 
Negro” exhibit. Not only, as already seen, did the portraits interrogate and challenge 
dominant white perceptions about “negro criminality”, but the collection also had the 
collateral effect of showing the power of visuality to construct race. Indeed, by collecting 
images of people of all skin tones, including white, who were nonetheless all labeled as 
“types of American negroes,” Du Bois indirectly pointed to the visual codes of racial 
distinction “showing a racial taxonomy founded in visual paradigms of recognition to be 
a fiction, albeit a powerful one.” 242 
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In the field of contemporary art, an African American conceptual artist who has 
explored the visuality of race is Glenn Ligon. In his works he aims at showing “the 
cognitive and conceptual filters through which forms of human otherness are mediated”243 
and to create new and subversive ways of seeing that take place outside the scopic regime 
of race. In his 1998 self-portrait (Figure 12), Ligon distances himself from issues of 
representation, as his goal is not to create an image (either positive or negative) of 
blackness, but rather to show the visual nature of race against “the viewers’ stubborn 
desire to see race represent difference”.244 Ligon’s self-portrait is composed by two 
identical black and white photographs of his full figure. The caption of the image on the 
left is “Self-Portrait Exaggerating My Black Features”, while the photograph on the right 
bears the caption “Self-Portrait Exaggerating My White Features”. Because the two 
images are identical, Ligon invites the viewer to look at the portrait and interpret the same 
                                               
243 W.J.T. Mitchell, Seeing through Race, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2012, p. XII. 
244 Alessandra Raengo, On the Sleeve of the Visual: Race as Face Value, Hanover (NH): Dartmouth 
College Press, 2013, p. 10. 
Figure 12: Glenn Ligon, Self-Portrait Exaggerating My Black 
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features both as the signs of blackness and as the signs of whiteness. However, as 
Alessandra Raengo states, 
[w]hile Ligon’s photographed body does not deliver any recognizable “whiteness,” it 
does deliver a commonsensically recognizable “blackness,” thus underscoring the 
constitutive imbalance between the two in the field of vision: of the two captions, only 
one appears truthful, plausible, and sensible.245 
The viewer is therefore forced to realize that his/her looking, far from being neutral 
or natural, is indeed “trained” to perceive blackness as a visible and perfectly recognizable 
sign but that, on the contrary, he/she is not able to perceive the visual signs of whiteness.246 
In other words, Ligon in his work is asking to read the two images against and outside 
the scopic regime of race, thus “open[ing] a chasm in the visual field”247 showing the 
visual dynamics through which race is itself constructed. 
Therefore, what it is important to highlight is that, while visuality has been conceived 
mainly as “a punitive field” where the abjection of blackness is continuously created and 
reproduced, the visual field can also become a site of resistance that holds liberatory and 
counterhegemonic possibilities. Indeed, black scholars, intellectuals, performers, artists 
and cultural producers in general have critically interrogated the field of visuality to bring 
to light the mechanisms of the scopic regime of race and have powerfully showed that the 
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Race is an extremely powerful illusion: discredited at the ethical level, since there 
is no correlation between one’s physical and moral features, as well as at the scientific 
level, as all humans share most of their genetic heritage, it remains nonetheless perceived 
as a reality. As already argued, even if race does not exist we are taught to see and decode 
human differentiation according to racialized traits, thus turning race into a filter through 
which to look at the world, and making the very act of seeing not “an act of direct 
perception, but the racial production of the visible.”248 Many studies have underlined that 
the realm of visuality is crucial for the production and reproduction of the idea of race 
itself and that the racial order is maintained by the continuous inscription of racial codes 
within an optical paradigm. The scopic regime of race works to naturalize the act of seeing 
race, so as to attribute to physical traits, most notably skin color, specific meanings and 
values.  
The crucial role that visuality plays in the identification and definition of what race 
is, in particular in the context of the US society, has been expressed very clearly by Toni 
Morrison in her 1983 short story “Recitatif.”249 The story follows the two main characters, 
Roberta and Twyla, from their childhood spent in the same orphanage to adulthood. The 
short story challenges the reader’s perceptions of race and identity by leaving the race of 
the two main characters ambiguous. The only clue provided by the narrator, Twyla, is 
that Roberta is “a girl from a whole other race” and together they looked “like salt and 
pepper.” Therefore, it is the audience that is left to decide which character is black and 
which is white.250 However, the attribution of a certain race to the characters shifts 
continuously throughout the story, as Morrison describes the appearance and the actions 
                                               
248 Judith Butler, “Endangered/endangering: schematic racism and white paranoia,” in Robert 
Gooding-Williams (ed.), Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 
16. 
249 Toni Morrison, “Recitatif,” in Amiri Baraka and Amina Baraka, Confirmation: An Anthology of 
African American Women, New York: Morrow, 1983, pp. 243-260. 
250 Alessandra Raengo, On the Sleeve of the Visual: Race as Face Value, Hanover (NH): Dartmouth 
College Press, 2013, pp. 6-7. 
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of Twyla and Roberta in a way that troubles the common “racial knowledge.”251 For 
example, the reader might initially think that Twyla is black, because of her name, 
however, later in the story it is Roberta that has “huge hair” and goes to a Jimi Hendrix 
concert. The contradictory descriptors, that aim at challenging widespread ideas about 
both blackness and whiteness, show how much race, rather than a physical and biological 
reality, is in fact a social and cultural construct. Morrison, by not stating clearly who is 
black and who is white, directly problematizes “the notion of race as a corporeal 
attribute”252, as she eliminates the visual markers of race and shows the inherently biased 
nature of the correlation between skin color and identity. Indeed, without visuality, the 
details about their lives and appearance become ambiguous, as the reader might attribute 
them to both characters.  
Despite its biological inconsistency, within the context of the US, race remains a 
crucial feature of one’s social and cultural identity and the idea that it is possible to read 
it on the body and on skin color is still pervasive. However, as already seen, the non-
existence of race does not mean that it does not have a real power and influence on the 
lives of racialized people, in particular of black people. The “paradox of race,” which is 
an integral part of US identity, has been addressed from many points of view depending 
on the social, cultural and political context. Indeed, discourses concerning the nature of 
race, its shifting meanings, its representation, as well as the very definition of the concept, 
are widely debated topics at all levels of US society.  
In the next sections I will address the case of Rachel Dolezal,253 a woman that has 
been accused of lying for decades about her identity, as she presented herself as a black 
woman, but she was in fact born to white parents. After the reconstruction of the case and 
the main reactions that it caused, I will move on to the analysis of the widespread 
allegations of blackface and “reverse passing” addressed at Dolezal by linking them to 
questions of representation and self-representation while discussing race-related issues. 
Finally, I will address the debate concerning the connection between transgender and 
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transracial identities that emerged from the comparison of Rachel Dolezal’s and Caitlyn 
Jenner’s identity claims. 
 
1.   The Rachel Dolezal affair 
In June 2015 a single case of what has been mainly perceived as “racial fakery” not 
only gained the attention of media worldwide, but it also became the site of intersection 
of a wide range of discourses and debates about race, as the case interrogated the concept 
and definition of race, issues regarding representation and visuality and even the history 
of the country’s racial identity.  
1.1. A case of “racial fakery” 
The peculiar story of Rachel Dolezal made headline news on June 11, 2015, when the 
media revealed that the president of the Spokane, Washington, chapter of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)254 was a white woman, 
although she had presented herself as black for a number of years. Dolezal was “outed” 
by her parents during an investigation carried out by a reporter for a newspaper of Coeur 
d’Alene, Idaho, where Dolezal used to live, regarding her many claims to have been the 
victim of hate crimes and harassment.255 With this article, however, the story remained 
mostly a local phenomenon and it was only when the video of an interview to Dolezal by 
a Spokane television station went online that the case rapidly gained worldwide attention 
and became a trending topic on social media. During the interview, the reporter asked 
Dolezal about the hate crimes that she had reported over the years, insinuating that she 
might have fabricated them and then he interrogated Dolezal’s racial and ethnic identity 
by directly asking if she or her parents were actually African American, a question to 
which the woman refused to answer.256  
                                               
254 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is one of the largest civil rights 
organization in the United States. It was founded in 1909 in response to the ongoing violence against black 
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being of all persons.” See the NAACP website: https://naacp.org/. 
255 See Jeff Selle and Maureen Dolan, “Black Like Me?,” CDAPress, June 11, 2015, 
http://www.cdapress.com/news /local_news/article_385adfeb-76f3-5050-98b4-d4bf021c423f.html.   
256 The full interview is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKRj_h7vmMM. See also 
Spokesman-Review, “Credibility of Local NAACP Leader Rachel Dolezal Questioned,” Spokesman-
Review, June 11, 2015, https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/jun/11/board-member-had-
longstanding-doubts-about-truthfu/; Jeff Humphrey, “Did NAACP President Lie about her Race? City 
Investigates,” KXLY.com, June 12, 2015, https://www.kxly.com/did-naacp-president-lie-about-her-race-
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The accusation of “racial fakery” and deception about her identity was mainly based 
on a set of photographs given to the media by Dolezal’s parents that portray Dolezal in  
 
 
her teenage years: the image is that of a pale girl with blond straight hair. This image 
stands in stark contrast with the 37-year-old woman that appears in the video of the 
interview, who has indeed a much darker complexion and dark curly hair (See Figure 13 
and Figure 14).  
After the photos of teenage Dolezal and her biological family flooded the internet, 
the issues of her manufactured racial history and the alteration of her appearance to “look 
black” became a widely discussed topic in the news and on social media. Many questions 
started to be raised about Dolezal’s true identity and many people have attempted to 
                                               
city-investigates/ Jeff Humphrey, “How the Coeur d’Alene Press Broke the Rachel Dolezal Story,” 
KXLY.com, June 15, 2015, https://www.kxly.com/how-the-coeur-dalene-press-broke-the-dolezal-story/. 
Figure 13: Rachel Dolezal when she was a teenager. Figure 14: Rachel Dolezal in 2015. 
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“make sense”257 of her seemingly unprecedented racial and ethnic path by investigating 
Dolezal’s past.  
Indeed, over time, detailed accounts of her past life that have tried to provide a 
broader context and possible explanations to this peculiar case have been published.258 In 
2017 a publishing house has also released Dolezal’s autobiography in which she 
addresses most of the questions, doubts and criticisms regarding her identity.259  
What emerged clearly from the very beginning in the various interviews in which 
Dolezal participated in the next months after her “outing,” however, was her assertion 
that she identified as black, a claim that she has never abandoned.260 Indeed, in her 2017 
autobiography while attempting to explain the reasons why she was not able to answer 
the seemingly straightforward question “Are you African American?” that started the 
Dolezal case, she repeats: 
On the surface it was a simple question, but in reality, it was incredible complex. Yes, 
my biological parents were both white, but, after a lifetime spent developing my true 
identity, I knew that nothing about whiteness described who I was. At the same time, I 
felt it would have been an oversimplification to have simply said yes. After all, I didn’t 
identify as African American; I identified as Black.261 
Obviously, this statement has given rise to many different reactions, as it addresses 
a wide range of issues regarding race, namely the meanings attached to the concept itself, 
its socially constructed or biological nature, and the persistence of racial categories as a 
common form of identification and self-identification mainly based on physical traits; 
Dolezal’s statement also problematizes the definition of blackness itself and the question 
of who is entitled to define it and finally it poses questions regarding cultural 
                                               
257 Matthew Pratt Guterl, “Racial Fakery and the Next Postracial: Reconciliation in the Age of 
Dolezal,” Charles Ogletree and Austin Sarat, Racial Reconciliation and the Healing of a Nation: Beyond 
Law and Rights, New York: New York University Press, 2017, p. 28. 
258 See for example Allison Samuels, “Rachel Dolezal’s True Lies,” Vanity Fair, July 19, 2015,  
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Sunderland, “In Rachel Dolezal’s Skin,” Vice.com, December 7, 2015, 
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‘I Wasn’t Identifying as Black to Upset People. I Was Being Me,’” The Guardian, December 13, 2015, 
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259 Rachel Dolezal, In Full Color: Finding my Place in a Black and White World, Dallas TX: 
BenBella Books, 2017. 
260 The first time that Dolezal asserted that she identified as black was during an interview with Matt 
Lauer on the Today Show that took place on June 16, 2015, only a few days after her case had become a 
news sensation. The interview is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lG9Q2_Hv83k.  
261 Dolezal, In Full Color, p. 1. 
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appropriation and white privilege.262 Dolezal’s past history provides a useful starting point 
for the analysis of the debate that this case has generated in the United States, as it can 
provide a broader context for the accusations of racial imposture by showing her actual 
position regarding the black community and black culture in general.  
 
1.2. Dolezal’s background 
Dolezal’s parents are fundamentalist evangelical Christians who decided to adopt 
four black children when she was a teenager. According to her autobiography, she played 
a significant role in raising and caring for her siblings, who had been also one of the main 
reasons why she started to be interested in black culture and history, though Dolezal 
claims that she felt a natural attraction to blackness even before her parents decided to 
adopt her siblings.263 Over the years of college and university, Dolezal was immersed in 
mostly African American networks and institutions, despite not presenting herself as 
black yet; when she was studying art at Belhaven College in Mississippi she became an 
active member of the Black Students Association and after her BA she also attended the 
historically black Howard University in Washington. Moreover, the focus her artwork are 
mainly African and African American themes and subjects. After having attained her MA, 
                                               
262 Rogers Brubaker, Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 3. 
263 Dolezal, In Full Color, pp. 63-64.  
Figure 15: Rachel Dolezal in 1996 with her parents, her biological brother, and 
her four adopted siblings. 
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Dolezal grew closer to black history and culture and she taught for several years in the 
Africana Studies program of Eastern Washington University as a part-time instructor.  
In Spokane she also became a well-known and respected civil rights activist 
focusing on black issues, as she was not only the president of the local NAACP chapter, 
but she was also part of the city’s police ombudsman commission as an advocate for black 
interests and organized many Black Lives Matter protests. As for her private life, she was 
married for some years to a black man and had one child with him and later she became 
the legal guardian of one of her adopted siblings; she also identified an African American 
man as her father.264 Dolezal started to alter her appearance, present herself and be 
perceived as a black woman after the divorce, as she began to darken her skin and style 
her hair in typically black hairstyles, such as braids, weaves and dreadlocks. Both her 
colleagues and her students did not have doubts about her identity, as her appearance was 
perfectly in line with her network of relationships, her political interest, her commitment 
in the black community and her cultural knowledge, as well as with racialization in the 
U.S., which due to the one drop rule and its consequences is based as much on ancestry 
as on the phenotype.   
This general background of Dolezal’s life and experiences clearly shows how a 
clear-cut judgment of her case as “racial deception” might turn out to be problematic; as 
a matter of fact, if one the one hand the ways in which she has altered her appearance and 
biography might be easily seen as instances of cultural appropriation and, for some 
commentators, even of blackface, on the other hand, it is impossible not to acknowledge 
the fact that Dolezal did not appropriate only the specific aspects of blackness which are 
considered “cool,” nor she did it for some kind of personal interest, rather she was actually 
deeply immersed in African American contexts, both on the private an on the public 
level.265 
 
                                               
264 In her autobiography, as well as in various interviews, she explains the identification of a black 
man as her father by stating that he had been indeed a fatherly figure for her and that they would normally 
refer to each other as father and daughter despite not being biologically related. See Dolezal, In Full Color, 
pp. 153-154. 
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2.   Reactions to the Dolezal case 
As already stated, the peculiarity of Dolezal’s case and her “transgression of the 
race line”266 generated a huge debate and fueled new and often contrasting discourses and 
reflections on the topic of racial identity. The overwhelming majority of the reactions 
have been entirely negative and, almost paradoxically, her case soon became the target 
of harsh criticism that was coming from groups of people that on a general level have 
quite opposite points of view on racial issues. As a matter of fact, Dolezal’s “racial 
fakery” has been thoroughly condemned and, in some cases, ridiculed both by deeply 
conservative and racist commentators and by many antiracist websites, scholars and 
journalists, obviously for very different reasons.  
Indeed, while for racists and white supremacists Dolezal’s path towards blackness 
has been seen as a clear sign of mental instability, as “no normal white person would 
choose to call themselves black,”267 antiracist commentators have condemned Dolezal’s 
physical alterations by accusing her of cultural appropriation and racial “masquerade,”268 
thus referring to a modern version of blackface as well as to the idea of “reverse passing,” 
that will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Only a small minority of voices 
has judged the case of Rachel Dolezal in a positive way and has supported her claim to 
self-identification as a black woman not only by underlining her actual connections with 
black contexts and culture and her longstanding commitment to racial justice, but also by 
pointing to the fictitious and socially constructed nature of race. 
In the next sections of this paragraph, these contrasting ideas will be analyzed more 
in detail, by focusing in particular on the intertwined issues of blackface, passing and 
cultural appropriation and how they have been used to either support or contrast Dolezal’s 
identity claims.  
 
2.1. Blackface and cultural appropriation 
One of the main criticisms addressed at Dolezal when her story boomed on the news 
and on social media was based on the fact that she had profoundly altered her “true” 
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aspect over the years by adopting black hairstyles and darkening her skin. Indeed, many 
black commentators have accused Dolezal of enacting a modern form of blackface, thus 
implying that her claim to blackness was in fact just a spectacle that she had enacted by 
putting a mask on her face and through the performance of an identity to which she has 
no legitimate claim.269 In an article written a few days after the photos of teenage Dolezal 
appeared online, the cultural black critic Zeba Blay directly referred to Dolezal’s racial 
act as a “costume she can put on – and take off – as she pleases” and that ultimately she 
was enacting an impersonation of a black woman and “merely indulging in the fantasy of 
being ‘other’.”270 The connection that Blay and other commentators271 have drawn 
between the degrading practice of blackface minstrelsy and Dolezal’s performance of 
blackness is clear. The blackface accusation in this case does not only refer to the 
offensive practice of darkening one’s skin and acting out stereotypes, but, in a broader 
sense, it also includes the appropriation of aspects of black culture by white people for 
their own benefit.  
Indeed, this kind of criticism inscribes Dolezal’s “imitation of blackness”272 within 
the many episodes of cultural appropriation through which white people have exploited 
and adapted to their own needs “cool” aspects of blackness while, at the same time, not 
having to be subjected to institutionalized racism and to the stigma of actually being 
black. In an article on The New Yorker, Jelani Cobb, who in fact was mostly supportive 
of Dolezal’s identity claims, also acknowledged and explained the anger expressed by 
black commentators regarding what they considered an act of cultural appropriation and 
blackface. By referring to the concept of “white Negroes”273 he explains that they  
                                               
269 See for example Khadijah White, “Blackness Isn’t Something That Can Be Acquired with a Little 
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272 Brubaker, Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities, p. 8. 
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share the luxury of being able to slough off blackness the moment it becomes 
disadvantageous, cumbersome, or dangerous. It is an identity as impermanent as burnt 
cork, whose profitability rests upon an unspoken suggestion that the surest evidence of 
white superiority is the capacity to exceed blacks even at being black.274 
The idea of “white Negroes” is similar to what has been defined the phenomenon of 
“wiggerism” which involves appropriation and stereotyping, as it refers to a practice 
enacted by white young people, called “wiggers,” to adopt cultural repertoires and 
behavioral styles, mainly taken from the domain of music, language, and dress that are 
generally coded and readable as black.275  
However, later in the article, Cobb states that, while the anger expressed by the 
black community is indeed understandable, he does not believe that Dolezal’s case should 
be inscribed within the phenomenon of “wiggerism”, as Dolezal did not just benefit from 
being perceived as a black woman, but she was also subjected to “the inglorious, 
frustrating parts of that identity.”276 Following the same reasoning, the academic Damon 
Sajnani, while acknowledging that Dolezal has surely appropriated black culture, also 
points to the fact that, at the same time, it is not possible to “reduc[e] Rachel’s 
‘performance’ to Black-face minstrelsy.”277 Indeed, according to Sajnani, not all cases of 
appropriation necessarily involve some kind of cultural theft; while Dolezal’s 
appropriation of black culture seem not to be motivated by self-interest, since she 
embraced all aspects, both positive and negative, of being black, it is clear that “[t]his 
cultural appropriation is qualitatively distinct from all the instances we know so well, 
from Minstrelsy to Presley and beyond,”278 which instead aimed at exploiting specific 
aspects of black culture for economic reasons. 
It is therefore clear how allegations of blackface and cultural appropriation might in 
fact be not very pertinent in the case of Rachel Dolezal, as it seems that, instead of 
adopting blackness as a temporary performance, Dolezal has altered her appearance and 
her biography and has adopted aspects of black culture to achieve a realistic and 
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permanent blackness.279 In other words, Dolezal did not merely want to adopt blackness 
as a mask that could be taken off at any moment; on the contrary she was clearly aiming 
at adopting blackness as her permanent and “true” identity, as it was also the way in which 
she wanted to be perceived and identified by others. It is Dolezal herself that, while 
addressing the accusations of treating blackness as a masquerade, during an interview for 
Vanity Fair stated: “[My identity is] not a costume. […] It’s not something that I can put 
on and take off anymore,”280 and in a later interview she also responded to criticism and 
claimed that 
[blackface is] made to be a mockery. Blackface is not pro-black. Blackface is not 
working for racial justice. Blackface is not trying to undo white supremacy. I would 
never make a mockery of the very things I take the most seriously.281 
Because Dolezal’s adoption of a black identity seems not to have been driven by the 
desire to enact stereotypes or to appropriate only specific aspects of blackness, some 
commentators have argued that Dolezal’s case can be seen as a rare instance of “reverse 
passing” from whiteness into blackness.282  
 
2.2.  A case of “reverse passing” 
The concept of passing is an integral part of the US debate about race. Over time, the 
topic has been studied from many different perspectives and has also been the main 
subject of a huge number of movies and books. The fact that passing is still nowadays a 
widely discussed topic when addressing race related issues, derives directly from US past 
history of chattel slavery, segregation under Jim Crow and a generalized white paranoia 
over racial purity, the maintaining of the racial hierarchies, and the possible transgression 
of the color line due to the peculiarity of US racialization.283  
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The creation of an extremely rigid system of racial classification aimed at policing 
the boundaries of whiteness has been a major concern from slavery onward, and its 
legacy, as the case of Rachel Dolezal has shown, still holds a strong influence on today’s 
US society. The system of racial categorization was based on the one drop rule, a social 
and legal norm according to which any person with any known African ancestry, no 
matter how small the trace (just “one drop” of black blood) was automatically identified 
as black. The one drop rule became a common practice starting from the eighteenth 
century to enforce and maintain the system of racial domination by policing what was 
considered “miscegenation” 284 between blacks and whites. During segregation, many 
Southern states adopted legal definitions of blackness to preserve racial integrity using 
variation of the original one drop rule, which was deemed illegal by the US Supreme 
Court only in 1986.285  
It should be noted that if on the one hand, the one drop rule has created a sharp and 
rigidly policed color line between different racial classifications, on the other hand the 
fact that a single drop of “black blood” was enough to be considered black, enabled the 
emergence of the phenomenon of passing, as many light-skinned people who were legally 
considered black, could easily be taken for white.286  
Throughout the history of the United States, stories of “racial migration,” that is the 
movement from one racial identity to another, have overwhelmingly been about people 
passing from the less privileged to the more privileged category, i.e. from blackness to 
whiteness, in order to enjoy the opportunities than derive from being socially defined as 
white. Movements from blackness to whiteness have always been quite common within 
US society, given the great number of people whose physical characteristics were 
readable as white.287 Paradoxically, it was precisely when the boundaries between races 
were more rigidly policed that more mixed-race people attempted to pass as white in order 
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to escape degrading situations; as Rogers Burbakers has argued, “[t]he color line, sharp 
and rigidly policed in theory, was blurred and porous in practice.”288  
The peculiarity of the Dolezal case therefore, resides in the fact that hers was a rare 
instance of a person that was born with white privilege and decided to alter her appearance 
and social relationships to be perceived as belonging to an inferior group. The permanent 
nature of her transformation, however, while making charges of cultural appropriation 
incongruous, enabled the association with historical instances of passing as white, as 
“[s]he appears to have been living her life as a Black person, living and working within 
the Black community, and there is no reason to believe she had any intention of 
reverting.”289 
As rare as this phenomenon is, however, there have been other cases of “reverse 
passing” in the history of the United States.290 For example, white people have decided to 
adopt black identities to circumvent legal or social prohibitions of interracial unions, such 
as in the case of Clarence King, a white man who, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
passed as black to marry a woman who was born a slave.291 Other cases of self-
identifications as black were purely instrumental and temporary, such as that of the 
journalist John Howard Griffin who, at the end of the 1950s, darkened his skin and 
traveled through the Deep South to recount the experience of segregation from the point 
of view of a “real” black person, or the various instances of reverse passing to gain access 
to affirmative action benefits.292  
What is most striking about Dolezal’s reverse passing, and what ultimately left 
many commentators puzzled by her case is not only that she consciously decided to 
identify with blackness, that is a much less privileged condition within US society, but 
also that her choice seem not to have been motivated by any kind of self-interest like in 
the cases of reverse passing seen above.  
As a matter of fact, it is worth noting that on this issue there is no agreement, since, 
when the Dolezal case exploded, there has also been a share of commentators that did in 
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fact question the idea that she did not have personal benefits in presenting herself as a 
black woman and that she actually “profited both personally and professionally from 
passing as black.” 293 The academic Khadijah White, for example, has clearly stated that 
Dolezal was benefiting from her adoption of a black identity, as she “occupied and 
dominated spaces ostensibly reserved for people who had life-long experiences of racial 
marginalization and disenfranchisement,”294 while Matthew Pratt Guterl has claimed that 
“her blackness paid the bills” and that “[s]he did what she did, in part, because […] she 
saw blackness as a route to greater success and fame.”295  On the other hand, however, it 
is undeniable that the fact of being perceived as black carries an inescapable social stigma; 
moreover, it seems that most of her activities and the positions that she had achieved were 
in fact unpaid, thus implying that she did not gain substantial economic benefit from her 
passing.296    
Nevertheless, criticism regarding the benefits that she might have gained by adopting 
a black identity is just one aspect of all the negative reactions that her “outing” caused. 
As a matter of fact, most of the criticism addressed at Dolezal’s identity claims revolved 
around the idea that she simply could not be black because she had no known African 
ancestry and that her body, before the alterations, could not be “read” as black.297 The few 
commentators that have supported Dolezal’s identification with blackness, such as 
Melissa Harris-Perry and Camille Gear Rich, however, have highlighted how these kinds 
of assertions are indeed problematic, as they “troublingly mirror the essentialist logic of 
the one-drop rule”298 and ultimately fail to recognize the social construction of race and 
its lack of foundation in concrete identifiers. In other words, underlining the importance 
of ancestry and phenotype over racial classification means to indirectly subscribe to the 
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original idea created under slavery and supported by the theories of scientific racism that 
race is a biological, and therefore immutable, category.299  
This modern version of race as biologically determined reproduces the rigid and 
inescapable divisions imposed by the color line. Indeed, the very concept of “passing” is 
inherently based on the biological conception of races, thus doubling down on the idea 
that race is natural, real and fixed.300 The rigidity of racial boundaries in the United States 
is also proven by the language used to talk about the people that consciously decide to 
trespass those boundaries, since the term “passing” inherently implies a form of deception 
and fakery. The language frame, therefore only enables negative interpretations of the 
crossing of racial boundaries and does not leave space for the idea that, exactly because 
race is a fiction that does not depend on phenotype and ancestry but is socially 
constructed, it is possible to legitimately cross the color line and embrace a different racial 
identity. As Guterl puts it, “[t]he downside of that language [is] that it wants us to believe 
that race is a hard, material thing, [and] that it conceptualizes all movement across the 
color line as subterfuge.”301  
It is therefore clear, by analyzing the debate regarding Dolezal’s identity claim to 
blackness, that conceptions about a supposedly biological reality of race are still 
widespread and still inform the ongoing debate about racial identity, despite having been 
entirely discredited. The legacy of the one drop rule has created a paradoxical context in 
which a person that discovers a single black ancestor in the family’s past can legitimately 
claim to be black, even if he/she has been raised as white and has never subjectively 
identified as such, but that at the same time Dolezal’s claims can be rejected despite her 
actual connections to blackness.302  
Another widespread accusation addressed ad Dolezal’s passing was that, being born 
and raised in a white family and having lived as white for decades, she could not claim a 
black identity as she did not live the “black experience” from birth. As White puts it,  
Rachel Dolezal’s seeming attempt at “reverse passing” comes with none of this historical 
baggage, duress, or danger. To put it simply, Rachel Dolezal was a con artist. She was 
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raised with the advantages of being born white in America and can, at any time, return 
to that identity and privilege.303 
The overall idea is that racial identity is also based on a shared history of living and 
being treated as a member of that specific racial category; therefore, Rachel Dolezal could 
not be considered black, because she lacked the lifelong experience and the often-
negative consequences of being socially categorized as a black person. However, as the 
political scientist Adolph Reed Jr. has argued, this idea is, once again, another instance 
of the essentialism of discourses about race, even if it is not rooted in biology and it is 
rather a historical form of essentialism.304 The problem with these kinds of thoughts is 
that they imply that an authentic and definitive black experience that is shared by all 
Americans socially categorized as blacks exists. While this might be true for many 
people, Reed argues, it should also be highlighted that “being black” and “blackness” 
include different experiences, social contexts, cultural practices, etc., thus implying that 
referring to an “authentic” way to be black in the United States is an inherently biased 
idea.305 
The troubling implications of essentialist claims about race, both biological and 
historical are also addressed by the historian Paul Spickard when he uses the examples of 
two actors, Halle Berry and Vin Diesel, to show how racial identity and self-identification 
might in fact be more complicated than essentialist discourses would claim. These two 
examples also challenge the idea that there is an “authentic” blackness and a common 
experience shared by all those identified and self-identifying as black. Indeed, Halle Berry 
who is “visually” a light-skinned black and presents herself as a black woman, was born 
and raised in a white context. Therefore, just like Rachel Dolezal, she did not grow up in 
an “authentic” black context, but because of her appearance, her identification as black is 
unquestioned. On the other hand, the actor Vin Diesel, who “looks” white and was raised 
by his white mother and his black stepfather, has chosen to call himself a person of color, 
although there is no evidence he has any African American ancestry.306  
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From these examples it is clear that, despite the strong ideological rigidity around 
racial classifications, within US society, racial identities are much more complex and not 
fixed and that essentialist discourses “routinely fail to recognize that race is a social 
imposition of perception, rather than a property of individuals or groups.”307  
Therefore, what is worth challenging is the idea of race itself and the ways in which 
it has shaped current understandings of racial identity and classifications. As Cobb 
poignantly argued as a conclusion of his commentary on the Dolezal case on The New 
Yorker:   
Rachel Dolezal is not black—by lineage or lifelong experience—yet I find her 
deceptions less troubling than the vexed criteria being used to exclude her. If blackness 
is simply a matter of a preponderance of African ancestry, then we should set about the 
task of excising a great deal of the canon of black history, up to and including the current 
President. If it is simply a matter of shared experience, we might excommunicate people 
like Walter White, whose blue eyes were camouflage that could serve both to spare him 
the direct indignity of racism and enable him to personally investigate and expose 
lynchings. Dolezal was dishonest about an undertaking rooted in dishonesty, and no 
matter how absurd her fictional blackness may appear, it is worth recalling that the 
former lie is far more dangerous than the latter.308 
 
3.   Trans identities: race and gender 
The question of Rachel Dolezal’s self-representation and identification as a black 
woman emerged in the United States within an already heated social and cultural debate 
about identity-related issues. Indeed, only a few days before Dolezal’s story made 
headline news worldwide, Caitlyn Jenner, the Olympic sports figure and famous 
television personality formerly known as Bruce Jenner, appeared on the cover of Vanity 
Fair to announce her identification as a woman and her consequent transition. Jenner’s 
story received massive public attention and, overall, the reactions on the media and on 
social networks were almost entirely positive, thus marking “a new stage in the 
mainstreaming of transgender identity.”309 Because of the timing and the fact that both 
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Dolezal’s and Jenner’s stories were related to identity claims, the two cases from the very 
beginning were intertwined in the public debate.  
The transgender phenomenon, and the case of Jenner in particular, soon became the 
point of reference within the public discourse on the Dolezal case; the main theme of the 
debate revolved around the possibility to legitimately choose and change one’s racial or 
gender identity. In other words, the core question that started a widely participated public 
discussion was: if Caitlyn Jenner can identify, and be accepted, as a woman, is it possible 
for Rachel Dolezal to legitimately identify, and be accepted, as black? If Jenner is 
generally recognized as a transgender person, is it possible to refer to Dolezal as a 
“transracial” person? 
In the next sections of this paragraph I will address the debate regarding the possibility 
of pairing transgender and transracial identities. Firstly, the focus will be on the categories 
themselves, the meanings that they have developed over time, and the ways in which in 
recent decades both racial and gender identity claims have expanded. Then I will move 
on to the debate generated by the juxtaposition of Jenner’s and Dolezal’s cases and the 
arguments for and against the legitimacy of “transracial” identities. 
 
3.1. Transgender and transracial 
Over the last decades, the term “transgender” has gained increasing importance not 
only within the debate about gender identity, but also at the institutional level, as the 
possibility to undergo the gender transition is legally regulated and recognized. Both at 
the popular and at the academic level the existence of transgender identities has been 
increasingly normalized and nowadays, though transgender people still have to face 
widespread discrimination, in the United States their identity claims are generally 
acknowledged and accepted as entirely legitimate.310  The term “transracial”, on the other 
hand, has a much longer history than “transgender,” but, before the Dolezal case, it was 
mainly used as a specialized term in the field of interracial adoption, which has been and 
still is a debated and at times controversial issue in the United States.311  
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As Rogers Brubaker has argued, the prefix “trans” in the two terms carries very 
different meanings: while in “transgender” it signals a new opportunity for transgender 
people to be recognized and accepted, the “trans” in “transracial” points to the possible 
difficulties that adoptees and adoptive families might face because of racial differences. 
Despite the common idea of crossing previously established boundaries, then, the 
implications of the two terms are indeed opposite: crossing gender boundaries enables 
people to claim the gender they feel true to their identity, while crossing racial boundaries 
might threaten the adoptees’ “authentic” racial identity.312 Therefore, when the term 
“transracial” started to be used in relation to Rachel Dolezal’s identity claim to identify 
as black, it immediately framed the consequent debate within a negative perspective and 
an implicit reference to the dangers deriving from crossing racial boundaries.313  
Even if the two terms have emerged in different contexts and with nearly opposite 
implications, however, it is worth noting that the success that both have gained mirrors 
the increasing complexity that surrounds the debate about identity. Indeed, basic 
categorizations, both in the field of gender and race, have progressively been perceived 
as more fragmented and fluid and therefore more open to choice and self-determination, 
rather than natural and given categories that cannot be questioned. In the context of 
gender identity, for example, not only has gender transition been normalized and 
recognized, but also more fluid and “queer” gender categories that unsettle the traditional 
binary system have emerged and are gaining importance in many contexts.314  
In a similar way, in the domain of race, the traditional categorical and binary 
framework has been challenged. Indeed, within the United States, racial identities are 
increasingly more complex and less stable as a consequence of different immigration 
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patterns and the constant rise of intermarriage rates. The changing racial landscape is 
most evident when one analyzes the ways in which censuses have been carried out by the 
US Census Bureau has addressed the issue over the last decades, as well as the ways in 
which people have responded to the census questions concerning racial identity. Indeed, 
major changes started to occur in the 1970s, when it was established that the questions 
about racial identity were to be answered by respondents themselves rather than by census 
personnel based on their own perception. Moreover, over time, the range of options has 
expanded widely, and in 2000 the possibility to choose multiple races was also 
introduced. Reports conducted by the Census Bureau have shown that the number of 
people that self-identifies with more than one race has increasingly grown over the last 
twenty years; interestingly the research has also underlined the fact that there is a huge 
number of Americans that change their racial identification from one census to the 
other.315  
It is clear, therefore, that, as a consequence of changing paradigms and the blurring 
of the boundaries between traditional categories, both the field of gender and the field of 
race have experienced enlargement in the scope of choice and self-identification. 
However, for a number of different reasons, while gender transition is almost universally 
recognized as legitimate, the same cannot be said for changing one’s race. As the debate 
emerged after the pairing of Jenner’s transgender identity and Dolezal’s transracial 
identity has showed, “prevailing public understandings cast gender and race as radically 
different forms of embodied identities.”316 
 
3.2. Comparing trans identities 
When Rachel Dolezal was “outed” as a white woman who was trying to pass as 
black by her parents, her immediate response to this accusation, as already seen, was that, 
while she was indeed born to white parents she identified as black. From the very 
beginning, Dolezal herself has implicitly drawn a parallelism between her peculiar 
situation and the transgender experience; in various interviews she has stated that the term 
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“transracial” could indeed capture her unusual racial path and the fluidity of her 
identity.317 Moreover, in her autobiography, the language of transness emerges very 
frequently throughout the book as a way to explain her journey towards her true identity. 
For example, when Dolezal addresses the accusation of passing, she states: 
My situation was different. Just as a transgender person might be born male but identify 
as female, I wasn’t pretending to be something I wasn’t but expressing something I 
already was. I wasn’t passing as Black; I was Black, and there was no going back.318 
The juxtaposition of transgender and transracial identities has generated a heated 
debate about the freedom to legitimately change one’s racial categorization in the same 
way in which a transgender person can change her/his biologically assigned sex at birth. 
Within the public debate different and often contrasting opinion have emerged, but, on a 
general level, the idea that Jenner’s and Dolezal’s cases could not be compared as they 
referred to entirely different experiences and that transracial identity simply “is not a 
thing”319 has been the most widespread. 
While most of the commentators have recognized Jenner’s identity claim and rejected 
Dolezal’s, it is worth noting that there have also been specific groups that have turned to 
their advantage Dolezal’s case in order to delegitimize both the concepts of transgender 
and transracial identities. Indeed, conservatives and Christian fundamentalists, in a 
strenuous attempt to preserve both gender and racial boundaries, have pointed to the 
absurdity of Dolezal’s claim to subvert racial categorization to imply that Jenner’s claims 
were by no means different.320 Paradoxically, a similar opinion has been expressed also 
by some radical feminists, who have highlighted the fact that many arguments used to 
reject Dolezal’s claim could indeed be applied to Jenner’s transition. For example, they 
have highlighted that, if it was possible to appeal at Dolezal’s lack of a lifelong and 
“authentic” history as a black woman to dismiss her claims, the same reasoning could be 
valid for Jenner, as she had decided to transition only later in life.321 
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As already stated, however, the position shared by the overwhelming majority of 
commentators has been that of rejecting any kind of equivalence between Jenner and 
Dolezal by underlining the fundamental difference between “transgender” and 
“transracial”. Indeed, the overall idea is that gender identity is a subjective individual 
property that is uncoupled from the body, whereas racial identity not only is tightly 
coupled to the body, most notably to skin color, but also grounded in social relations, 
specifically in family and ancestry. Therefore, while changing one’s gender is seen as a 
legitimate and accepted possibility, changing one’s race is perceived as completely 
illegitimate. From this perspective, Dolezal’s identity claims have been accused of being 
detrimental and potentially threatening both for the anti-racist discourse and for 
transgender activism. As Blay has put it: “comparing Dolezal’s behavior to the real 
struggles of black and trans people is dangerous, irresponsible, and sets back the progress 
we’ve made in discourse on race and gender.”322  
From the point of view of those who fight for the social progress of transgender 
people, therefore, Dolezal’s case was seen as a threat to the still-fragile legitimacy of 
transgender claims, which were gaining importance in the public debate after Jenner’s 
story. The overall idea is that, by appropriating the rhetoric and recognizable language of 
transgender people, Dolezal was giving credence “to the deepest, most malicious lie there 
is about transgender identity and queer sexuality—that they are deceitful.”323 From this 
perspective, therefore, while being transgender is an objective, unchosen condition, 
proven by the fact that it is legally recognized and that transgender people can undergo 
hormonal and surgical treatments, being transracial is simply a choice that has no 
objective basis, thus implying that “Dolezal cannot become black in any meaningful 
sense.”324 As the writer and trans activist Meredith Talusan stated:  
The fundamental difference between Dolezal’s actions and trans people’s is that her 
decision to identify as black was an active choice, whereas transgender people’s decision 
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to transition is almost always involuntary. […] Dolezal identified as black, but I am a 
woman, and other trans people are the gender they feel themselves to be.325 
For similar reasons Dolezal’s identity claims have been rejected by anti-racists as 
threatening for the ongoing struggle for racial equality. The main argument was, again, 
that while Jenner was expressing her true inner self, Dolezal was simply performing an 
identity that did not legitimately belong to her.  The underlying reasons to support the 
claim that race cannot be legitimately changed or chosen, which have been already 
analyzed in the previous sections, point to Dolezal’s lack of any known African American 
ancestor, a lifelong black experience and a shared history of living and being treated as a 
member of the black community.326 Therefore, even if Dolezal has successfully presented 
herself as a black woman and has been immersed in black contexts for a long time, this 
does not mean that she actually “became” black; indeed, she only passed as black and the 
concept of passing, no matter the reason to do it, “intrinsically involves deception.”327 
From this perspective, then, accepting that Dolezal is actually black, could turn out to be 
threatening for the fight against racism, as it might encourage other opportunistic, or at 
least fraudulent, racial identity claims. 
Finally, there have been a few commentators who have interpreted the “if Jenner, then 
Dolezal” syllogism in a positive way, meaning that it is in fact possible to compare Jenner 
and Dolezal’s identity claims. Starting from the widespread opinion that Jenner was 
indeed a woman, they stated that, following a similar reasoning, it was possible to 
acknowledge, or at least consider, Dolezal’s identification as black. Just a few days after 
the Dolezal case made headline news, MSNBC’s Melissa Harris-Perry directly referred 
to the pairing of transgender and transracial identities when discussing with the historian 
Allyson Hobbs about the possibility, by analogy to the transgender experience, that there 
might be “a different category of blackness, that is about the achievement of blackness, 
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despite one’s parentage.”328 Other commentators, such as the sociologist Ann Morning, 
have also stressed the similarities between transgender and transracial claims and have 
supported the idea that the boundaries of racial categories, just as those of gender 
categories, are increasingly blurred; therefore, challenging the accusation of deception 
addressed at Dolezal, she argues that people’s racial affiliation and identity might indeed 
change.329 As the legal scholar Camille Gear Rich has put it, 
Dolezal is disturbing for many people because she marks a cultural fault line. Like it or 
not, we have entered into an era of elective race - a time when people expect that one 
has a right and dignity to claim the identity of one's choice.330 
In general, the arguments in support of Dolezal’s identity claims and the pairing with 
the transgender experience are based on constructivist theories of race and in particular 
on the idea that, like gender, race is increasingly understood “as something that we do, 
not something that we have – as a matter of reiterated doing rather than a stable being.”331 
In contrast with essentialist views of race that stress the importance of ancestry, genetic 
heritage, lifelong experience and supposed “authenticity,” therefore, according to this 
perspective, legitimately achieving and changing one’s racial category is indeed possible. 
However, because widespread ideas about race are still rooted in biology, this theoretical 
possibility “will depend on a society’s willingness to adjust its rules for racial 









                                               
328 The full interview is available at https://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/watch/rachel-
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The brutal murder of George Floyd at the hands of the police on May 25, 2020 has 
brought racial injustice into sharp focus, fueled global protests and reinforced the 
#BlackLivesMatter movement in United States. The viral video depicting a white 
Minneapolis police officer kneeling on Floyd's neck until he died has become almost 
immediately a shocking reminder of what it still means to be black in America. 
Throughout the centuries, the construction of racial blackness as a degraded and abject 
condition has justified the exploitation and oppression of black people and its legacy is 
indeed still present in today’s US society. The murder of Floyd, therefore, is only one of 
the most recent acts of the violence perpetrated against black bodies in the United States 
that started with the brutalization and the enslavement of millions of Africans in the 
Atlantic slave trade.  
As this research work has thoroughly argued, the concept of race in the Unites States 
still plays a crucial role in the lives of individuals and in society as a whole. Despite 
having been recognized as a social construct and not a biological reality, it is painfully 
clear that the concept of race is far from being eradicated, as shown by the persistence of 
racism and racial thinking at all levels of society. The creation and the ceaseless 
reproduction of the concept of race began during the colonialist period and the Atlantic 
slave trade and its main aim was to justify the violent brutalization of black bodies by 
making them seem less than human, according to specific physical traits.  
As has been demonstrated by generations of scholars, intellectuals and academics, for 
the production and reproduction of race visuality and the field of representation have been 
fundamental, as there is a strong connection between dynamics of domination and 
representation. In particular, the production of controlling stereotypical images of black 
people throughout the centuries has contributed to the naturalization of the link between 
blackness and degradation, an idea that still persists today. Indeed, the visual archive of 
blackness constructed from slavery onward still holds a strong power in today’s society, 
as it functions as a framework through which reality is perceived, and it influences society 
at the popular and at the institutional level. 
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Racialized depictions of black people have been here analyzed to show not only the 
power of representation for the maintaining of racial hierarchy, but also the ways in which 
the racist archive has changed throughout the centuries to adapt to different patterns of 
oppression. Therefore, while before Emancipation stereotypes were mainly concerned 
with black people’s innate submissive nature and lack of independence so as to justify 
their enslavement and represent them happy in it, in the postbellum period the stereotypes 
were constructed to highlight the savage and violent nature of black people as a response 
to the need to control the freed black population. 
Throughout the centuries, therefore, black people have been forced to see themselves 
through the white dominant gaze and have been constantly denied the possibility to 
articulate their own subjectivity. However, this condition has not reduced the black 
subject to a passive victim; as a matter of fact, black people have developed their own 
“oppositional gaze” to challenge and contest the dominant regime of representation that 
has created the inherent association between blackness and abjection. Through a wide 
range of counterstrategies and resistant acts of countervisuality, blacks have contested the 
dominant modality of visuality as well as its exclusive claim to make sense and organize 
reality in a longstanding struggle to regain power over their self-representation. In this 
resistance struggle, black people have not only questioned the truthfulness of the racist 
archive, but they have also created alternative and counterhegemonic images to reclaim 
their own worth and humanity and have interrogated the act of seeing itself. 
The fight over the control of visuality, which has constituted an actual “war of 
images,” started even before the end of slavery, as the examples of Fredrick Douglass and 
Sojourner Truth have demonstrated. The revolutionary ways in which they engaged the 
visual culture of their time is a powerful demonstration of agency and of the possibilities 
to resist stereotypical narratives even in the worst conditions of domination. Another 
fundamental example of resistance to the dominant gaze is represented by W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s collection of photographs assembled for the 1900 Paris Exposition, which did not 
only provide an alternative visual archive of blackness but it also, most importantly, 
problematized the question on race itself through the practice of signifying. 
After Emancipation and throughout the twentieth century, the fight over the realm of 
visuality has gained increasing importance as a consequence of the emergence and the 
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fast growth in popularity of new media, like cinema and television, as well as of the 
rapidly changing social condition of black Americans. Indeed, over time African 
Americans have deployed a number of different strategies to engage hegemonic 
representations. The major representational strategy they have used is based on the 
concepts of realism and authenticity and aims at highlighting the untruthful nature of 
racist caricatures and at substituting them with alternative representations that show the 
reality of black people and the truth of black experience. As important as this strategy has 
been in the history of black Americans to challenge the racial order, however, this realistic 
approach carries also huge limitations, as it postulates the existence of a single true and 
authentic black experience, which is in fact far more complex and varied. In other cases, 
however, black people have challenged the dominant cultural order and the seemingly 
natural meanings that it imposes by means of non-mimetic strategies, such as negotiation 
and the appropriation of stereotypes through irony and parody.  
As for the issues of race and representation, an important change that has taken place 
over the last decades is the shift of focus from the war of images to the field of visuality 
itself. Indeed, black scholars and cultural producers have claimed for a politics of 
representation that critically interrogates the realm of white visuality and that moves 
beyond mere contests over positive/negative images. The overall idea is that by showing 
and uncovering the visual mechanisms through which human differentiation, racialized 
subjects and the black/white polar opposition are constructed, it is possible to effectively 
challenge and denaturalize the concept of race itself and demonstrate its fictitious and 
socially constructed nature. 
Bringing together various issues regarding race and representation, the case of Rachel 
Dolezal, the woman accused of racial fakery and outed as white by her parents, is the 
evidence of the strong power that the concept of race and race thinking still hold on 
today’s US society. The photographs showing the stark contrast between her skin and 
hair during her teenage years and her current appearance flooded the internet in the 
summer of 2015 causing a heated debate about the legitimacy of Dolezal’s identity claim 
to “identify as black,” despite being born to white parents. 
The overwhelming majority of commentators has thoroughly rejected Dolezal’s 
assertions and has condemned her attempt at transgressing the color line with allegations 
of blackface and cultural appropriation. Her altered appearance has been seen as the 
 102 
ultimate proof of white privilege, as a mask or a costume that Dolezal could always take 
off at will, while black people cannot escape the racialization inscribed on their real 
bodies. Dolezal has also been seen as a rare case of “reverse passing” from whiteness into 
blackness, that is from the more privileged to the less privileged category. The 
accusations addressed at Dolezal have shown how much the concept of race in the US is 
still influenced by the rigid system of racial classification constructed and enforced from 
slavery onward. Indeed, the few commentators that have supported Dolezal’s identity 
claims have highlighted that the persistence of racial categories as a common form of 
identification and self-identification mainly based on physical traits and ancestry mirrors 
the racial thinking that conceives race as natural, given and immutable. The Dolezal case 
has therefore demonstrated how frequently essentialist discourses about race might 
reemerge in the context of the United States, where the crossing of racial boundaries 
directly interrogates the very core of the country’s national identity. Those who have 
supported Dolezal’s identification with blackness have, on the contrary, adopted a 
constructivist perspective about race, claiming that racial boundaries are in fact 
increasingly blurred and that, in the future, the idea that one might legitimately achieve 
and change his/her racial category is indeed possible.  
While it is true that racial categorizations are changing, and racial boundaries are not 
as fixed as they used to be, however, in the United States a future where race becomes 
elective is still far away. As the murder of George Floyd and many others have painfully 
shown, being black in the United States still means to be the carrier of all the negative 











LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 1: Apollo Belvedere, Negro, Young Chimpanzee. From Josiah Nott and George       
Gliddon, Types of Mankind: or, Ethnological Researches (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, Grambo, 1855). Widener Library, Harvard University …………33 
 
Figure 2: 19th century French print "La Belle Hottentot" of Saartjie Baartman………….34 
 
Figure 3: The Sambo caricature………………………………………………………...37 
 
Figure 4: The Mammy stereotype………………………………………………………38 
 
Figure 5: Josiah Wedgwood, Am I Not a Man and a Brother? (1787) ………………....40 
 
Figure 6: McPherson & Oliver, The Scourged Back, (1863) ……………………………40 
 
Figure 7: Unidentified photographer, Sojourner Truth’s carte de visite, ca. 1860, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University……………………………………53 
 
Figure 8: Frederick Douglass in a daguerreotype taken by Samuel J. Miller dated 1847-
1852. Cased half-plate daguerreotype, The Art Institute of Chicago………...56 
 
Figure 9 and 10: Du Bois, Types of American Negroes, Georgia, U.S.A., 1900, the Daniel 
Murray Collection, Library of Congress………………………………58 
 
Figure 11: Josephine Baker, 1927………………………………………………………68 
 
Figure 12: Glenn Ligon, Self-Portrait Exaggerating My Black Features/Self-Portrait 
Exaggerating My White Features, 1998……………………………………72 
 
Figure 13: Rachel Dolezal when she was a teenager……………………………………78 
 
Figure 14: Rachel Dolezal in 2015……………………………………………………...78 
 
Figure 15: Rachel Dolezal in 1996 with her parents, her biological brother, and her four 





































Amin, Ash. “The Reminder of Race,” Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 27, no. 1, 2010, 
pp. 1-23. 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of 
Race,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 1, 1985, pp. 21–37. 
-   In my father's house: Africa in the philosophy of culture. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
-   Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, delivered at University of California, 1994. 
 
Baker, Houston A. and Simmons K. Merinda (eds.). The Trouble with Post-Blackness, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 
 
Barrett, Lindon. Blackness and Value: Seeing Double, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
-   Racial Blackness and the Discontinuity of Western Modernity, Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 2013. 
 
Bennett, Michael and Dickerson, Vanessa. Recovering the Black Female Body: Self 
Representations by African American Women, New Brunswick: Rutgers, 2000. 
 
Bhabha, Homi. “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of 
Colonialism,” in The location of culture, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 94-120. 
 
Bogle, Donald. Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies & Bucks: An Interpretative History 
of Blacks in American Films, New York-London: Continuum, 1973. 
 
Bordin, Elisa and Bosco, Stefano. A Fior di Pelle: Bianchezza, Nerezza, Visualità, 
Verona: ombre corte, 2017. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers. Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
 
Brundage, W. Fitzhugh (ed.). Beyond Blackface: African Americans and the Creation of 




Butler, Judith. “Endangered/endangering: schematic racism and white paranoia,” in 
Gooding-Williams, Robert (ed.), Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, New 
York: Routledge, 1993. 
 
Carby, Hazel. Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-
American Woman Novelist. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
-   “Policing the Black Female Body in an Urban Context,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 18, 
no. 4, 1992, pp. 738-755. 
 
Collins, Patricia Hill. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 2000. 
 
Copeland, Huey and Thompson, Krista. “Perpetual Returns: New World Slavery and the 
Matter of the Visual,” Representations, vol. 113, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-15. 
 
Crawford, Margo Natalie. “Who’s Afraid of the Black Fantastic? The Substance of 
Surface,” in Black Post-Blackness: The Black Arts Movement and Twenty-First-Century 
Aesthetics, Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2017. 
 
Davis, David Brion. “How Africans Became Integral to New World History,” in Inhuman 
Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006.  
 
De Franceschi, Leonardo. “Spaghetti blackface: pratiche performative al di là della linea 
del colore,” in Petrovich Njegosh, Tatiana (ed.), La realtà transnazionale della razza. 
Dinamiche di razzializzazione in prospettiva comparata, in “Iperstoria”, 6, 2015, pp. 76-
93. 
 
Diawara, Manthia. “Black British Cinema: Spectatorship and Identity Formation in 
Territories,” in Houston A. Baker Jr., Manthia Diawara and Ruth H. Lindeborg, Black 
British Cultural Studies: a Reader, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
 
Dyer, Richard. White, London: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Dolezal, Rachel. In Full Color: Finding my Place in a Black and White World, Dallas 
TX: BenBella Books, 2017. 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. “The Study of the Negro Problems,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 11, 1898, pp. 1–23. 
-   “The American Negro at Paris,” American Monthly Review of Reviews, vol. 22, 
no. 5, 1900, pp. 575-77. 
 107 
-   The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches, Chicago, A. G. McClurg, New 
York: Johnson Reprint Corp, 1903. 
 
Elam, Harry and Jackson, Kennell. Black Cultural Traffic: Crossroads in Global 
Performance and Popular Culture, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks, New York: Grove Press, 1967. 
 
Finney, Carolyn. “Brave New World? Ruminations on Race in the Twenty-first Century,” 
Antipode, vol. 46, no. 5, 2014, pp. 1277-1284. 
 
Fleetwood, Nicole. Troubling Visions: Performance, Visuality, and Blackness, Chicago-
London: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
-   On Racial Icons: Blackness and the Public Imagination, New Brunswick (NJ): 
Rutgers University Press, 2015. 
 
Foster, Hal. “Preface,” in Vision and Visuality, Washington: Bay Press, 1988, pp. ix-xiv. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, London: Verso. 
1993. 
-   Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line, Cambridge 
(MA): Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Goldberg, David Theo. The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberism, London: 
Blackwell, 2009 
 
Gray, Herman S. “Black Cultural Politics and Commercial Culture,” in Watching Race: 
Television and the Struggle for Blackness, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1995, pp. 1-13. 
-   Cultural Moves: African Americans and the Politics of Representation, University 
of California Press, 2005. 
 
Guterl, Matthew Pratt. “Racial Fakery and the Next Postracial: Reconciliation in the Age 
of Dolezal,” in Ogletree Charles and Sarat Austin, Racial Reconciliation and the Healing 
of a Nation: Beyond Law and Rights, New York: New York University Press, 2017. 
 
Hall, Stuart. “Encoding/Decoding,” in Stuart Hall et al. (eds.), Culture, Media, Language, 
London: Hutchinson, 1980 
-   “Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation,” Framework: The Journal of 
Cinema and Media, no. 36, 1989, pp. 68-81. 
 108 
-   “What Is This ‘Black’ in Black Popular Culture?” Social Justice, vol. 20, no. 1/2 
(51-52), 1993, pp. 104-114. 
-   “The After-Life of Franz Fanon: Why Fanon? Why Now? Why Black Skin, White 
Masks?” in Read Alan (ed.), The Fact of Blackness: Franz Fanon and Visual 
Representation, Seattle: Bay Press, 1996. 
-   Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, London: 
Sage in association with the Open University, 1997. 
 
Harries, Bethan. “We Need to Talk about Race,” Sociology, vol. 48, no. 6, 2014, pp. 1107-
1122. 
 
Hartman, Saidiya. Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-
Century America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Hill, Ginger. “Rightly Viewed,” in Wallace and Smith, Pictures and Progress, 2012, pp. 
41-82. 
 
hooks, bell. Black Looks: Race and Representation, Boston: South End Press, 1992. 
-   Where We Stand: Class Matters, New York: Routledge, 2000. 
 
InteRGRace, Visualità e (anti)razzismo, Padova: Padova University Press, 2018. 
 
Jay, Martin. “Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Foster Hal (ed.), Vision and Visuality, 
Washington: Bay Press, 1988, pp. 3-23. 
 
Lott, Eric. Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
Lubiano, Wahneema. The House that Race Built: Black Americans, U.S. Terrain, New 
York: Random House, 1997. 
 
Marriot, David. Hunted Life: Visual Culture and Black Modernity, New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2007. 
 
McClintock, Anne. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest, New York: Routledge, 1995.   
 
McIntosh, Peggy. “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Backpack,” Peace and 
Freedom Magazine, July/August 1989, pp. 10-12, a publication of the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom, Philadelphia, PA. 
 
 109 
Mitchell, W.J.T. “Showing Seeing,” Journal of Visual Culture, vol. 1, no. 2, 2002, pp. 
165-181. 
-   Seeing through Race, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2012. 
 
Mirzoeff, Nicholas. “Beyond Comparison,” in Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and 
Visual Representation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
-   The Visual Culture Reader, London: Routledge, 1998. 
-   An Introduction to Visual Culture, New York-London: Routledge, 1999 
-   The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality, Durham (NC): Duke University 
Press, 2011. 
 
Morrison, Toni. “Recitatif,” in Baraka Amiri and Baraka Amina, Confirmation: An 
Anthology of African American Women, New York: Morrow, 1983, pp. 243-260. 
 
Oboe, Annalisa and D’Agostini, Giulia. “Archivi del Futuro. Il Postcoloniale, l’Italia e il 
Tempo a Venire,” in From the European South, 2016. 
 
Ogletree, Charles and Sarat, Austin. Racial Reconciliation and the Healing of a Nation: 
Beyond Law and Rights, New York: New York University Press, 2017. 
 
Osuji, Chinyere. “Boundaries of Whiteness: Flexibility and Shifting Meanings,” in 
Boundaries of Love: Interracial Marriage and the Meaning of Race, New York: New 
York University Press, 2019. 
 
Painter, Nell Irvin. “Representing Truth: Sojourner Truth's Knowing and Becoming 
Known,” The Journal of American History, vol. 81, no. 2, 1994, pp. 461-492. 
 
Raengo, Alessandra. On the Sleeve of the Visual: Race as Face Value, Hanover (NH): 
Dartmouth College Press, 2013. 
 
Rohrbach, Augusta. “Shadow and Substance,” in Wallace and Smith, Pictures and 
Progress, 2012, pp. 83-100. 
 
Roach, Shoniqua. “Black Respectable Currency: Reading Black Feminism and Sexuality 
in Contemporary Performance,” The Journal of American Culture, vol. 42, no. 1, 2019, 
pp. 10-20. 
 
Rogin, Michael. “Blackface, White Noise: The Jewish Jazz Singer Finds His Voice,” 
Critical Inquiry, vol. 18, no. 3, 1992, pp. 417-453. 
 
 110 
Roth, Lorna. “Looking at Shirley, the Ultimate Norm: Colour Balance, Image 
Technologies, and Cognitive Equity,” in Hall Ronald (ed.), The Melanin Millennium: 
Skin Color as 21st-Century International Discourse, New York: Springer, 2012. 
 
Said, Edward. Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. 
 
Scacchi, Anna. “Le figlie di Hagar: la rappresentazione del corpo femminile nero negli 
Stati Uniti,” in Cattarulla Camilla (ed.), Identità americane: corpo e nazione, Roma: 
Cooper, 2006, pp. 15-41. 
-   “Da Gordon a Django. Figurazioni dell’eroismo e memoria della schiavitù negli 
Stati Uniti,” in Petrovich Njegosh Tatiana, La “realtà” transnazionale della 
razza. Dinamiche di razzializzazione in prospettiva comparata, in “Iperstoria,” 6, 
2015, pp. 8-25. 
-   “Vedere la razza/fare la razza,” in Bordin Elisa and Bosco Stefano, A Fior di 
Pelle: Bianchezza, Nerezza, Visualità, Verona: ombre corte, 2017, pp. 15-33. 
-    “Mettere in scena la razza. Visualità, autenticità e performance razziale,” in 
InteRGRace, Visualità e (anti)razzismo, Padova: Padova University Press, 2018, 
pp. 47-59. 
 
Shohat, Ella and Stam, Robert. “Stereotype, Realism and the Struggle over 
Representation,” in Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media, New 
York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 178-219. 
 
Smith, Shawn Michelle. “Visual Culture and Race,” MELUS, vol. 39, no. 2, 2014, pp. 1-
11. 
-   “‘Looking at One's Self through the Eyes of Others’: W.E.B. Du Bois's 
Photographs for the 1900 Paris Exposition,” African American Review, vol. 34, 
no. 4, 2000, pp. 581-599. 
 
Smith, Michelle. “Affect and Respectability Politics,” Theory & Event, vol. 17, no. 3, 
2014. 
 
Smith, Valerie. “From ‘Race’ to Race Transcendence: ‘Race,’ Writing, and 
Difference Twenty Years Later,” PMLA, vol. 123, no. 5, 2008, pp. 1528-1533. 
 
Sturken, Marita and Cartwright, Lisa. Practices of Looking: An Introduction of Visual 
Culture, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
 
Tamai, Anne, Dineen-Wimberly, Ingrid, et al. Shape Shifter: Journeys across Terrains of 
Race and Identity, University of Nebraska Press, 2020. 
 
 111 
Trodd, Zoe. “Am I Still Not a Man and a Brother? Protest Memory in Contemporary 
Anti-slavery Visual Culture,” Slavery & Abolition, vol. 34, no. 2, 2013, pp. 338-352. 
 
Tuvel, Rebecca. “In Defense of Transracialism,” Hypatia, vol. 32, no. 2, 2017, pp. 263-
278. 
 
Wallace, Maurice O. and Smith, Shawn Michelle (eds.). Pictures and Progress: Early 
Photography and the Making of African American Identity. Durham London: Duke 
University Press, 2012. 
 
West, Cornel. Race Matter, Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. 
 
Wexler, Laura. “A More Perfect Likeness,” in Wallace and Smith, Pictures and Progress, 
2012, pp. 18-40. 
 
Winant, Howard. “Race and Racism: Towards a Global Future,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, vol. 29, no. 5, 2006, pp. 986 -1003. 
 
Young, Harvey. Embodying Black Experience: Stillness, Critical Memory, and the Black 





Allen, Samantha. “Dolezal’s Damaging ‘Transracial’ Game,” Daily Beast, June 16, 2015, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/dolezals-damaging-transracial-game. Last accessed 29 
October 2020. 
 
Blay, Zeba. “Why Comparing Rachel Dolezal to Caitlyn Jenner Is Detrimental to Both 
Trans and Racial Progress.” Huffington Post, June 12, 2015. 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/racheldolezalcaitlynjenner_n_7569160?ncid=fcbklnkus
hpmg00000047. Last accessed 20 October 2020. 
 
Cobb, Jelani. “Black Like Her,” The New Yorker, June 15, 2015. 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/rachel-dolezal-black-like-her. Last 
accessed 21 October 2020.  
 
Humphrey, Jeff. “How the Coeur d’Alene Press Broke the Rachel Dolezal Story.” 
KXLY.com, June 15, 2015. https://www.kxly.com/how-the-coeur-dalene-press-broke-
the-dolezal-story/. Last accessed 20 October 2020. 
 
 112 
Jeffries, Michael P. “Rachel Dolezal a lesson in how racism works,” The Boston Globe, 
June 13, 2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/13/rachel-dolezal-story-
lesson-how-racism-works/J8R27qgq2YfDRUuOVhpYGI/story.html. Last accessed 24 
October 2020. 
 
Johnson, Kirk, Pérez-Peña Richard and Eligon, John. “Rachel Dolezal, in Center of 
Storm, Is Defiant: ‘I Identify as Black’,” The New York Times, June 16, 2015. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/rachel-dolezal-nbc-today-show.html. Last 
accessed 19 October 2020. 
 
Jones, Angela. “Rachel Dolezal Is Really Queer: Transracial Politics and Queer Futurity,” 
Social (In)Queery, June 17, 2015. https://socialinqueery.com/2015/06/17/rachel-dolezal-
is-really-queer-transracial-politics-and-queer-futurity/. Last accessed 27 October 2020. 
 
Kirabo, Sincere. “The Myth of Transracial Identity,” April 18, 2016. 
https://thehumanist.com/commentary/myth-transracial-identity. Last accessed 29 
October 2020. 
 
McGreal, Chris. “Rachel Dolezal: ‘I Wasn’t Identifying as Black to Upset People. I Was 
Being Me,’” Guardian, December 13, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasnt-identifying-as-black-to-upset-people-i-was-
being-me. Last accessed 22 October 2020. 
 
McKee, Kimberly, et al. “An Open Letter: Why Co-opting ‘Transracial’ in the Case of 
Rachel Dolezal Is Problematic,” Medium, June 16, 2015. 
https://medium.com/@Andy_Marra/an-open-letter-why-co-opting-transracial-in-the-
case-of-rachel-dolezal-is-problematic-249f79f6d83c#.eo89u8p3v. Last accessed 28 
October 2020. 
 
Morning, Ann. “It’s Impossible to Lie about Your Race,” Huffington Post, July 1, 2015, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/its-impossible-to-lie-about-your-race_b_7708598. Last 
accessed 30 October 2020. 
 
Murphy, Meghan. “You Can’t ‘Feel’ Race, but Can You ‘Feel’ Female? On Rachel 
Dolezal, Caitlyn Jenner, and Unspeakable Questions,” Feminist Current, June 17, 2015, 
https://www.feministcurrent.com/2015/06/17/you-cant-feel-race-but-can-you-feel-
female-on-rachel-dolezal-caitlyn-jenner-and-unspeakable-questions/. Last accessed 31 
October 2020. 
 
Pearce, Matt. “Decades before Rachel Dolezal, There Was Mark Stebbins in a Stockton 
Scandal,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2015. https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
stockton-dolezal-20150619-story.html. Last accessed 30 October 2020. 
 113 
 
Reed, Adolph. “From Jenner to Dolezal: One Trans Good, the Other Not So Much,” 
Common Dreams, June 15, 2015. 
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/06/15/jenner-dolezal-one-trans-good-
other-not-so-much. Last accessed 28 October 2020. 
 
Rich, Camille Gear. “Rachel Dolezal Has a Right to Be Black,” CNN.com, June 16, 2015. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/15/opinions/rich-rachel-dolezal/. Last accessed 25 
October 2020. 
Sajnani Damon.“Rachel/Racial Theory: Reverse Passing in the Curious Case of Rachel 
Dolezal,” Transition Magazine, June 13, 2015. 
http://hutchinscenter.fas.harvard.edu/news/hutchins/rachelracial-theory-reverse-passing-
curious-case-rachel-dolezal. Last accessed 31 October 2020. 
 
Samuels, Allison. “Rachel Dolezal’s True Lies.” Vanity Fair, July 19, 2015. 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/07/rachel-dolezal-new-interview-pictures-
exclusive. Last accessed 18 October 2020. 
 
Selle, Jeff and Dolan, Maureen. “Black Like Me?,” CDAPress, June 11, 2015. 
http://www.cdapress.com/news/local_news/article_385adfeb-76f3-5050-98b4 
d4bf021c423f.html. Last accessed 19 October 2020. 
 
Stryker, Susan. “Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal: Identification, Embodiment, and 
Bodily Transformation,” AHA Today, July 13, 2015. 
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-onhistory/summer-
2015/caitlyn-jenner-and-rachel-dolezal-identification-embodiment-and-bodily 
transformation. Last accessed 24 October 2020. 
 
Sunderland, Mitchell. “In Rachel Dolezal’s Skin,” Broadly, December 7, 2015. 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvz79j/rachel-dolezal-profile-interview. Last accessed 
20 October 2020. 
 
Talusan, Meredith. “There Is No Comparison between Transgender People and Rachel 
Dolezal,” The Guardian, June 13, 2015. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/12/comparison-transgender-
people-rachel-dolezal. Last accessed 28 October 2020. 
 
White, Khadijah. “Blackness Isn’t Something That Can Be Acquired with a Little 
Bronzer,” Quartz, June 13, 2015. https://qz.com/427519/rachel-dolezal-is-not-








































Nel corso deli secoli, e in particolare a partire dall’età moderna, l’esperienza della 
razza ha lasciato un segno indelebile nella storia dell’Europa e degli Stati Uniti ed ha 
contribuito in maniera sostanziale alla costruzione e alla definizione dell’identità stessa 
del mondo occidentale. La categoria della razza è stata, ed è tuttora, oggetto di studio e 
analisi, in ragione del fatto che essa continua ad influire sulla strutturazione del reale e 
sulla vita dei singoli, in special modo su quella dei soggetti razzializzati. Nel tempo, il 
concetto di razza ha assunto significati mutevoli ed è importante, per affrontare in maniera 
consapevole i razzismi presenti, comprendere come si sia evoluto e adattato ai diversi 
contesti economici, sociali e culturali. In effetti, il persistere del razzismo e, di 
conseguenza della razza come idea, pratica e segno identitario dimostra l’adattabilità del 
concetto stesso e la sua capacità di riprodursi incessantemente nel corso dei secoli.  
Nonostante l’esperienza della razza e del razzismo siano comuni all’umanità nel 
suo complesso, questo lavoro di ricerca si concentra sul contesto statunitense e, nello 
specifico, analizza la questione della costruzione e della rappresentazione della nerezza a 
partire dall’istituzione della tratta atlantica e del sistema schiavistico. L’obiettivo 
principale è quello di indagare la rappresentazione della nerezza nel corso dei secoli per 
comprendere come il corpo nero sia diventato l’emblema del soggetto razzializzato. Il 
potere della rappresentazione come pratica di dominio e di gerarchizzazione razziale della 
società rimane oggi più che evidente; in effetti il corpo nero, nell’immaginario comune 
continua ad essere associato a significati negativi e degradanti e spesso ad essere 
percepito come una minaccia, come dimostrano i frequenti omicidi di persone nere da 
parte della polizia negli Stati Uniti. Il campo del visuale, tuttavia, non viene inteso solo 
come il luogo in cui l’ordine razziale della società viene costantemente prodotto e 
riprodotto, ma anche come un possibile luogo di resistenza che può essere sfruttato dal 
soggetto nero per contestare la rappresentazione dominante della nerezza e sovvertire la 




Il primo capitolo analizza la rappresentazione della razza e il ruolo fondamentale che 
ha svolto la visualità per la costruzione del soggetto nero nel corso dei secoli. Il capitolo 
inizia interrogandosi sul concetto stesso di razza e sulle diverse posizioni rispetto a come 
questo dovrebbe essere utilizzato nel dibattito politico, sociale e culturale. Infatti, poiché 
è stato ampiamente dimostrato come la razza non abbia alcun base biologica o scientifica, 
ma sia invece una costruzione sociale e culturale, alcuni studiosi hanno proposto di 
abbandonare il concetto di razza come strumento di analisi della società contemporanea, 
sposando così l’idea di una società “post-razziale” basata sulla colorblindness. D’altra 
parte, altri studiosi hanno messo in luce come l’idea di abbandonare il concetto di razza 
risulterebbe in realtà controproducente, poiché non permetterebbe di riconoscere lo stretto 
legame tra la costruzione storica della razza e il razzismo istituzionalizzato presente nella 
società contemporanea. Questa condizione viene definita il “paradosso della razza”, ossia 
il fatto che, sebbene sia stata riconosciuta come una finzione, questa continui ad avere un 
potere reale nell’organizzazione della società e sulla vita degli individui. 
Nonostante l’inconsistenza a livello biologico ed etico, quindi, la razza continua a 
funzionare come dispositivo culturale di gerarchizzazione dell’umanità e, soprattutto, 
nella pratica quotidiana, continua ad essere una realtà visibile con cui dare senso e 
classificare la diversità umana. Risulta quindi chiaro come ci sia un legame inscindibile 
tra visualità e razza, come dimostra il fatto che, anche se non esiste una definizione valida 
di razza, continuiamo a vederla e a percepire la realtà in termini razziali. A livello 
accademico, è stato lo sforzo congiunto di due discipline, (critical studies of race e visual 
culture studies) che hanno analizzato più a fondo l’intreccio tra razza e visualità e hanno 
permesso di indagare la visione stessa come atto sociale, in cui vedere la razza non è un 
atto percettivo diretto e senza mediazione. Al contrario, l’atto del guardare implica 
l’interpretazione attiva dei dati visuali e l’attribuzione di significati e valori ad essi. 
Vedere la razza è dunque un atto performativo con il quale viene costruita l’immagine 
dell’Altro; in questo senso la razza è intesa come un filtro attraverso cui interpretare la 
diversità umana secondo criteri razziali.   
Il regime scopico della razza, ossia all’insieme dei sistemi visuali costruiti da chi 
detiene l’egemonia interpretativa, ha fatto sì che la classificazione della diversità umana 
in termini razziali fosse non solo possibile, ma anche percepita come naturale. Inoltre, ha 
creato un sistema in cui la razza, nella sfera visuale, è articolata all’interno di un 
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paradigma ottico all’interno del quale la pelle nera è un segno ipervisibile, mentre la 
bianchezza viene percepita come la norma non marcata; essere nero, dunque, significa 
occupare una posizione razzializzata mentre essere bianco significa rappresentare 
l’umano in generale e di conseguenza una posizione di potere.  
La produzione di immagini stereotipate dell’Altro, ovvero del soggetto nero, è la 
strategia adottata dal regime scopico della razza per mantenere la gerarchia razziale della 
società e giustificare il regime di oppressione e violenza imposto ai corpi neri. La potenza 
dello stereotipo risiede nella sua capacità di ridurre l’Altro ad una singola caratteristica 
(ad esempio la bestialità, la depravazione sessuale, etc.) che viene presentata come una 
condizione fissa e naturale. Nel contesto statunitense, tuttavia, gli stereotipi della nerezza 
costruiti nel tempo, non sono solo la lente attraverso cui i bianchi hanno imparato a 
conoscere i neri; gli afroamericani stessi sono stati costretti a guardare loro stessi 
attraverso lo sguardo dell’altro. Questa dolorosa condizione è stata definita “doppia 
coscienza”, ossia il dover interpretare la propria nerezza utilizzando i codici sociali dello 
sguardo egemone che sono stati interiorizzati dal soggetto nero. La rappresentazione della 
nerezza gioca quindi un ruolo fondamentale nelle dinamiche di potere. Nel corso dei 
secoli, la visualità della razza ha creato un gran numero di immagini stereotipate della 
soggettività nera che continuano, spesso anche inconsapevolmente, a strutturare la 
percezione della realtà. 
L’esame degli stereotipi della nerezza nella cultura visuale e di come si sono 
modificati nel corso dei secoli è il tema principale dell’ultima parte del primo capitolo. Il 
sistema di rappresentazione visuale della diversità umana ha inizio durante l’Illuminismo, 
in cui furono applicati i principi di classificazione utilizzati per piante e animali anche 
alla diversità umana, rendendo l’idea che l’umanità fosse divisa in diverse specie 
organizzate in maniera gerarchica una verità scientifica incontrovertibile. La gerarchia 
razziale veniva giustificata a livello visuale secondo parametri estetici che sottolineavano, 
da una parte, il legame tra la bianchezza e gli ideali di bellezza dell’arte classica e 
l’associazione tra pelle bianca e pulizia, progresso e civiltà e, dall’altra, la somiglianza 
dei neri con gli animali e il legame tra pelle nera e sporcizia e barbarie. Questo concetto 
di razza diventò ancora più diffuso nell’Ottocento con le teorie del razzismo scientifico, 
che, anche grazie all’utilizzo delle nuove tecnologie si proponeva di fornire una base 
scientifica e misurabile per spiegare l’inferiorità dei neri. È bene notare il ruolo 
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fondamentale che ebbe la fotografia nella creazione e diffusione delle immagini della 
differenza tra razze, grazie anche al fatto che era percepita come la riproduzione del reale 
oggettiva e senza mediazioni. 
La produzione visuale della nerezza basata anche sulle classificazioni prodotte dal 
razzismo scientifico risultò fondamentale per l’istituzione dello schiavismo negli Stati 
Uniti. A livello popolare, la naturalizzazione della gerarchia tra razze e la riproduzione 
del sapere razziale era fondata su una serie di immagini stereotipate che dipingevano la 
subordinazione dei neri come una condizione naturale che derivava da caratteristiche 
innate e immodificabili. Le immagini di controllo prodotte durante lo schiavismo erano 
diverse per uomini e donne, poiché dovevano giustificare regimi di oppressione distinti: 
le immagini della soggettività maschile nera, puntavano a sottolineare la loro natura 
infantile, ingenua e tendente alla sottomissione, per legittimare la schiavitù come 
un’istituzione patriarcale, naturale ed inevitabile; d’altra parte, la rappresentazione delle 
donne nere si basava sulla necessità di controllo del loro corpo e della loro sessualità, 
poiché le donne erano il mezzo di riproduzione della schiavitù stessa. Gli stereotipi della 
nerezza maschile, come Sambo, il nero infantile e sempliciotto o Tom, lo schiavo di casa 
felice di servire, e della nerezza femminile, come Mammy, la schiava devota alla famiglia 
bianca o Jezebel, la donna nera dalla sessualità aggressiva, diventarono, a livello 
popolare, la “grammatica di base della razza”, attraverso la quale il pubblico bianco 
americano ha imparato a vedere la nerezza.  
Dopo l’emancipazione, le immagini stereotipate dei neri prodotte durante lo 
schiavismo si modificarono per giustificare la necessità di controllo sociale della 
popolazione nera e il la costruzione di un sistema di segregazione razziale. In questo 
contesto, subirono una modificazione più profonda gli stereotipi della soggettività 
maschile nera, che si allontanarono dall’idea di sottomissione e ingenuità e che, al 
contrario rappresentavano l’uomo nero come un selvaggio violento e iper-sessualizzato. 
Nel corso del tempo, gli stereotipi hanno continuato a modificarsi per adattarsi a nuovi 
contesti, tuttavia essi hanno tutti contribuito alla costruzione di un diffuso “sapere 
razziale” che associa la nerezza ad una serie di valori e significati negativi. Anche nella 
società statunitense contemporanea questa associazione continua ad essere percepita 
come reale, rendendo la razza una categoria che influisce sulla vita quotidiana delle 
 119 
persone; a dispetto dell’inconsistenza biologica, infatti la razza continua ad avere una 
dimensione sociale e fenomenologica. 
 
Il secondo capitolo analizza il modo in cui, nel corso dei secoli, i neri hanno resistito 
alle rappresentazioni razziste e degradanti prodotte dallo sguardo egemonico bianco e 
hanno rivendicato il loro “diritto di guardare”. Il controllo sullo sguardo, infatti, non ha 
solo ridotto i neri a vittima passiva ma ha anche dato vita, nella sfera visuale, ad una vera 
e propria lotta per il riconoscimento della propria umanità, della propria soggettività e del 
proprio valore in opposizione agli stereotipi e alle caricature della nerezza.  Il potere degli 
oppressi di resistere allo sguardo e alla rappresentazione egemone passa non solo dalla 
denuncia degli stereotipi come immagini false e disumanizzanti, ma anche dalla 
costruzione di una visualità alternativa con cui è possibile sostituire l’archivio della razza, 
dando vita a quella che è stata definita una “guerra delle immagini”. Per contestare il 
regime scopico della razza e rivendicare il loro diritto a costruire la propria identità, i neri 
negli Stati Uniti hanno adottato varie strategie, a seconda del loro potere individuale e 
delle condizioni sociali, culturali e politiche.  Nella lotta per la riappropriazione della 
rappresentazione, i neri sono stati sia i produttori di immagini che l'oggetto delle 
immagini; in quest'ultimo caso, tuttavia, a differenza delle rappresentazioni razziste, non 
sono stati oggetti passivi dello sguardo dominante, ma sono riusciti a controllare e 
manipolare le proprie immagini per scopi artistici o politici e per sostenere le loro 
rivendicazioni.  
Il capitolo si concentra poi su alcuni degli esempi più celebri di rappresentazioni 
alternative della nerezza tra la fine dell’Ottocento e l’inizio del Novecento. Prima di tutto 
vengono presi in considerazione le autorappresentazioni di due figure cruciali della 
cultura statunitense, ovvero Frederick Douglass e Sojourner Truth. Entrambi ex schiavi, 
furono in grado di utilizzare la fotografia per produrre immagini di loro stessi che erano 
decisamente in contrasto con quelle proposte dalla visualità dominante, dando prova del 
controllo che esercitavano sulla loro immagine e sui significati ad essa associati. Infatti, 
utilizzando i canoni della fotografia della classe borghese dell’epoca costruirono 
un’immagine della nerezza maschile e femminile legate all’idea di rispettabilità e che 
utilizzarono per dare maggiore forza alle loro rivendicazioni politiche. Un altro noto caso 
di decostruzione della rappresentazione dominante fu quello di W.E.B. Du Bois, che, 
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come Douglass e Truth, era più che consapevole dell’importanza di proporre un diverso 
archivio della razza che rispecchiasse la realtà dei soggetti neri. Du Bois, all’esposizione 
universale di Parigi nel 1900 per la mostra sul “Negro americano” creò una raccolta di 
fotografie che ritraevano in maniera accurata le reali condizioni sociali, economiche e 
culturali degli afroamericani, oltre ad una serie di ritratti che mettevano in luce quanto 
l’idea della nerezza diffusa dagli stereotipi fosse ben lontana dalla realtà. 
Nel corso del Novecento, la questione della rappresentazione continuò a ricoprire 
un’importanza cruciale nella cultura americana, in particolar modo in seguito alla nascita 
e allo sviluppo del cinema e della televisione. La strategia di autorappresentazione più 
diffusa e maggiormente adottata dagli afroamericani per resistere alla violenza dello 
stereotipo fu quella basata sul realismo e l’autenticità e sulla sostituzione delle immagini 
razziste con una visualità composta di immagini interamente positive. È stato tuttavia 
sottolineato come questo tipo di approccio sia problematico e abbia avuto anche delle 
ricadute negative, poiché ha spesso marginalizzato altri tipi di rappresentazione. Infatti, 
l’idea di poter rappresentare la realtà della nerezza presuppone da un lato che esista un 
modo unico e autentico di essere neri, escludendo così chi non rientra in questo, e 
dall’altro lato che la rappresentazione sia specchio della realtà e che non sia, invece, per 
sua natura, mediata. Inoltre, l’enfasi sulla produzione di immagini esclusivamente 
positive ha l’effetto paradossale di rinchiudere la nerezza, ancora una volta in una serie 
di stereotipi. Questo tipo di strategia, basata su un’ottica correttiva, non ha il potenziale 
di mettere in discussione lo sguardo egemone e, in definitiva, implica l’accettazione dello 
stereotipo e l’internalizzazione delle norme e dei codici della cultura dominante. Di 
particolare importanza per questo approccio è stata, e spesso continua ad essere, la 
politica della rispettabilità utilizzata in special modo dalle donne nere per resistere agli 
stereotipi diffusi riguardo alla loro sessualità “eccessiva”. In altre circostanze, tuttavia, i 
neri hanno utilizzato approcci diversi per rapportarsi alla cultura egemone, ad esempio 
adattando lo stereotipo alle proprie necessità, e mettendo in campo quindi una strategia 
di negoziazione. Questo approccio risultò particolarmente importante per artisti, 
performers e attori neri che, costretti a impersonare gli stereotipi della nerezza, trovarono 
anche il modo di rendere potenzialmente sovversivi i ruoli a loro imposti. Un’ultima 
strategia di resistenza alla rappresentazione egemone si basa invece sul rifiuto dei codici 
dominanti e, tramite l’ironia e la parodia, sull’appropriazione dello stereotipo. 
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L’appropriazione ironica dello stereotipo ha permesso agli artisti neri non solo di 
utilizzare le rappresentazioni razziste a proprio vantaggio ma anche di sottolineare con 
indirettamente come la natura precaria e socialmente costruita dello stereotipo razziale. 
Anche questo approccio è stato spesso utilizzato dalle artiste nere che hanno rifiutato di 
conformarsi alla politica della rispettabilità decidendo invece di adottare stili eccessivi e 
di utilizzare l’ironia e la parodia per mettere in discussione le rappresentazioni dominanti 
del corpo femminile nero.    
L’ultima parte del capitolo prende in esame il cambio di prospettiva avvenuto negli 
ultimi decenni rispetto alla questione della rappresentazione della razza, che dalla “guerra 
delle immagini” è passato invece alla messa in discussione della sfera visuale stessa. 
Molti studiosi hanno infatti sottolineato come la produzione di immagini alternative, 
autentiche o positive della nerezza, per quanto importante, non possa risolvere il problema 
della rappresentazione. Per opporsi al regime scopico della razza è necessario, infatti, 
mettere in luce i meccanismi visuali attraverso i quali la razza stessa viene costruita e 
mostrare come l’atto di vedere la diversità umana in termini razziali non sia affatto 
naturale ma una pratica acquisita. 
 
Infine, il terzo capitolo prende in esame il caso di Rachel Dolezal, una donna 
americana che è stata accusata di aver mentito sulla propria identità, poiché si è presentata 
per svariati anni come donna nera nonostante i suoi genitori fossero entrambi bianchi. Nel 
giugno 2015 la storia della “falsificazione razziale” di Dolezal è diventata un caso a 
livello nazionale e internazionale, attirando l’attenzione dei media di tutto il mondo, e 
trasformandosi in brevissimo tempo in una discussione non tanto sulla storia in sé, ma sui 
concetti di razza e identità in una nazione come gli Stati Uniti in cui questi temi sono 
sempre più al centro del dibattito pubblico. Nella prima parte del capitolo viene ricostruito 
il caso in maniera più dettagliata mettendo in luce come le accuse di falsificazione razziale 
si basassero principalmente sul confronto tra le foto di Dolezal da adolescente, con la 
pelle chiara e i capelli lunghi e lisci, e il proprio aspetto da adulta dall’incarnato 
decisamente più scuro e con acconciature utilizzate tipicamente dalle donne 
afroamericane. Fin dall’inizio, Dolezal ha risposto alle accuse che le venivano mosse 
dichiarando di identificarsi come nera a dispetto dei propri genitori e tentando di 
dimostrare il suo legame con contesti sociali, culturali e familiari neri. Dolezal, infatti, 
 122 
non solo ha quattro fratelli neri adottati ed è stata sposata con un nero con cui ha avuto 
un figlio, ma, a livello professionale e pubblico ha anche lavorato come docente di vari 
corsi relativi alla cultura afroamericana ed è un membro attivo di diverse realtà che si 
battono per la giustizia e l’uguaglianza razziale. 
Il capitolo analizza poi le principali reazioni al caso, concentrandosi nello specifico 
sulle accuse di blackface e appropriazione culturale mosse a Dolezal. Nella maggior parte 
dei casi, le reazioni sono state interamente negative: da un lato, la pretesa di Dolezal di 
identificarsi come nera è stata vista dai commentatori razzisti e conservatori come un 
chiaro segno di instabilità mentale; dall’altro lato tuttavia, anche molte voci 
dell’antirazzismo hanno condannato le azioni di Dolezal accusandola di mettere in atto 
una forma contemporanea di blackface e di utilizzare quindi la nerezza come una 
maschera, un costume da poter inossare e togliere a piacimento per motivi opportunistici. 
Questo tipo di accusa fa rientrare l’imitazione della nerezza messa in atto da Dolezal in 
uno dei frequenti casi di appropriazione culturale attraverso cui i bianchi hanno sfruttato 
e utilizzato per profitto aspetti specifici della cultura nera, senza tuttavia dover essere 
soggetti al razzismo e alla violenza istituzionalizzati e allo stigma di essere neri. A difesa 
di Dolezal, però, è stato fatto notare come la sua adozione di un’identità nera non si 
limitasse all’appropriazione di aspetti positivi della cultura nera, ma abbracciasse anche 
tutti gli aspetti negativi di essere socialmente identificato come nero negli Stati Uniti.  
Poiché l’alterazione del proprio aspetto e della propria biografia da parte di Dolezal 
sembra essere stato non tanto una performance temporanea ma il tentativo di essere 
percepita come nera in maniera realistica e permanente, il percorso intrapreso da Rachel 
Dolezal è stato visto come un raro caso di passing da un’identità razziale bianca ad una 
nera. Il concetto di passing è stato, e continua ad essere, una parte fondamentale del 
dibattito sulla razza negli Stati Uniti. Questa pratica di simulazione identitaria è emersa 
in risposta alla creazione di un sistema estremamente rigido di classificazione razziale 
durante il periodo schiavista basato sulla one drop rule, una norma sociale e legale 
secondo la quale chiunque avesse anche solo un antenato nero veniva identificato come 
tale. Tuttavia, nella storia degli Stati Uniti, la pratica del passing è stata utilizzata quasi 
esclusivamente per passare da una categorizzazione razziale ritenuta subalterna a quella 
egemone, per poter godere dei diritti e dei privilegi ad essa connessi; la scelta di Dolezal 
di identificarsi come nera, quindi, è in decisa controtendenza nel panorama statunitense. 
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L’aspetto problematico dell’accusa di passing rivolta a Dolezal, tuttavia, è che spesso, 
per sostenerla sono stati utilizzati argomenti che richiamano la logica essenzialista del 
concetto di razza basata sulla one drop rule; la rivendicazione identitaria di Dolezal, 
infatti, è stata spesso rifiutata sulla base della sua mancanza di antenati neri, rimettendo 
quindi in campo un’idea di razza basata sulla biologia. Un’altra accusa molto diffusa nei 
confronti di Dolezal è stata quella di non aver vissuto da nera, e di conseguenza di non 
essere stata percepita e trattata come tale, per tutta la vita e quindi di non aver avuto 
un’esperienza nera “autentica”. Anche in questo caso, tuttavia, coloro che hanno difeso 
la legittimità del percorso di Dolezal hanno fatto notare come anche questo sia un discorso 
di stampo essenzialista che propone l’esistenza di un modo unico e autentico di essere 
neri, quando nella realtà la nerezza si compone di diverse esperienze, contesti, pratiche 
sociali, quotidiane e culturali. 
In ultimo, il capitolo prende in considerazione il paragone tra le rivendicazioni 
identitarie di Dolezal e quelle di Caitlyn Jenner di identificarsi come donna e analizza il 
dibattito pubblico relativo alla possibilità di cambiare legittimamente categorizzazione 
razziale così come è possibile per l’identità di genere per le persone transgender. Viene 
prima di tutto messo in luce come entrambe le categorie di razza e genere, nel corso degli 
ultimi decenni, si siano allargate in maniera considerevole per accogliere rivendicazioni 
identitarie complesse e non per forza rispettose del sistema tradizionale di tipo binario 
uomo/donna e bianco/nero, lasciando quindi più spazio alla scelta e 
all’autodeterminazione individuale. Tuttavia, quando Dolezal stessa, utilizzando il 
termine “transrazziale” ha paragonato la sua autoidentificazione come donna nera con il 
percorso di transizione di genere di Jenner la maggior parte dei commentatori hanno 
rifiutato il confronto tra le due rivendicazioni, considerando legittima l’identità 
transgender ma non quella transrazziale. Secondo chi ha sostenuto questa posizione, 
infatti, mentre essere transgender è una condizione non scelta e oggettiva, come 
dimostrano il riconoscimento legale e la possibilità di sottoporsi ad interventi ormonali e 
chirurgici, cambiare razza è una scelta individuale non supportata da basi oggettive. 
Quindi, il fatto che Dolezal si sia presentata come nera e sia stata riconosciuta come tale 
per un certo periodo di tempo non significa che sia effettivamente diventata nera, ma che 
abbia solo finto di esserlo. In contrapposizione a questo pensiero diffuso, tuttavia, altri 
hanno considerato più che plausibile l’identificazione di Dolezal, ritenendo che 
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l’identificazione razziale si possa legittimamente cambiare in ragione del fatto che la 
razza, così come il genere, è sempre meno una categoria dai confini stabiliti e sempre più 
intesa come qualcosa che “si fa” nelle pratiche sociali e quotidiane. Tuttavia, poiché le 
idee diffuse sulla razza sono ancora radicate nella biologia, la possibilità di riconoscere 
le identità transrazziali dipenderà dalla volontà della società di adeguare le proprie regole 
di categorizzazione razziale per meglio adattarsi all'autoidentificazione individuale. 
 
